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Summary 
 
Evolutionary theory provides the biological sciences, with a fundamental and 
powerful model to explain the emergence of cooperative behavior. A detailed 
explanation for the existence of cooperation between related individuals is provided 
by the theory of kin selection. When kin cooperate the helper gives the receiver an 
advantage and thereby increases the relative probability that copies of his own 
genes are present in the next generations. However, one cannot explain examples of 
apparent altruism through kin selection, because in these cases unrelated individuals 
interact. The answer for many of these examples is provided by the theory of 
reciprocal altruism, where individuals behave reciprocal by returning help to a 
previous donor. By applying these two theories it is possible to explain many, but by 
far not all cooperative situations. There have to be other mechanisms that lead to 
cooperation and sustain already established cooperation.  
 In my dissertation I have tested empirically new models and predictions of 
how cooperation between unrelated humans can be established. This research is 
especially important because we interact in a close net of relationships, where 
cooperation between unrelated individuals plays one of the main roles. Modern 
human societies are impossible to imagine without cooperation between unrelated 
individuals. By identifying the circumstances under which cooperation is stable 
between unrelated individuals, it will be possible to understand the deciding factors in 
politics, economy and in our private lives. As a consequence we would be provided 
with intellectual tools to positively influence the deciding factors by alternating the 
circumstances accordingly. 
 We are often not aware of the importance of cooperation between unrelated 
partners in our daily lives. Regularly people find unconsciously cooperative solutions, 
for instance when they try simultaneously to walk through a narrow door. Some 
professions depend very strongly on cooperative behavior between unrelated 
colleagues. To act uncooperatively in such a profession can endanger the health or 
even the lives of the colleagues (e.g. firemen and firewoman). Cooperative strategies 
for these kinds of situations have to have evolved and need to be evolutionary 
stable, otherwise we would hardly ever find cooperative behavior in the present and 
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then only between related individuals. According to the evolutionary theory the 
cooperative strategies found today, also have to provide an advantage to the bearer.  
 For a long time economists and biologists have been interested in the 
emergence and sustainability of cooperative behavior. Nevertheless, only with the 
introduction of game theory, a mathematical basis was established to incorporate 
this behavior into biological evolutionary models. From then on it was possible to 
make predictions with the help of theoretical models, about the circumstances under 
which certain behavioral patterns emerge and what underlying mechanisms possibly 
sustain these patterns.  
 In my dissertation I have empirically tested predictions of circumstances that 
promote cooperative behavior between unrelated humans. The main results of my 
work are the following: (i) Humans often donate money to charity. On first sight this 
seems to be a disadvantageous behavioral trait. Donations to charity include costs 
that reduce the direct fitness of the individual. However, it has to be beneficial to the 
bearer, otherwise it would be eliminated from the population through evolutionary 
processes. The study showed that there is indeed an advantage. By donating money 
to charity (here to UNICEF) one builds up a good personal reputation in the own 
social group. Participants that donated to UNICEF received with higher probability 
help from other participants and were as well more likely to be voted the group 
representative. (ii) Reputation is known to be an important currency in indirect 
reciprocity games. Humans therefore should also try to establish a good reputation in 
other social games, when this reputation is known in future indirect reciprocity 
games. Humans are in general unable to sustain a public resource that everybody is 
free to overuse anonymously. Is it possible that humans sustain a public resource if 
the use of the resource is linked to the personal reputation? The experiment showed, 
that the risk of loosing a good reputation by overusing the public resource actually 
lead to sustaining it. Furthermore the public resource was not only sustained, but 
also turned out to be surprisingly profitable to all group members. (iii) A theoretical 
model supplied a new possibility to sustain a public resource and hereby make 
humans act cooperatively. The strikingly simple idea was to introduce the possibility 
not to participate in the public goods group and instead use a personal resource with 
a low but sure payoff.  The prediction was an always recurring rise to dominance, of 
three strategies ((a) not to participate in the public goods group, (b) participate in the 
public goods group and to cooperate within the group or (c) participate and to defect 
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within the group) within the population. This dynamic was expected because 
whenever most members of the population choose the same strategy, one of the 
other two strategies had a higher payoff. The same type as the predicted dynamic 
has also been found in models of the famous children game of “rock-paper-scissors”. 
The model predicted that the public resource is sustained by the ongoing dynamic, 
which is liked with a recurring rise of cooperative behavior. Is it enough to supply 
humans with the possibility not to participate in the public goods game to produce 
such recurring rise of cooperation? The dynamic was established as predicted, 
whereby the changing dominance of the three strategies with repeated cooperative 
phases could be observed and the resource was on average sustained. (iv) When 
humans make decisions about using a public resource, which at some times are 
reputation relevant and at other times are not reputation relevant, do they use this 
information strategically?  In this study it was shown that, humans are aware when 
their decisions are not reputation relevant and immediately reduce their cooperation 
to maximize their personal profit. Once more, as soon as the decisions about using 
the public resource were linked to the reputation, cooperation was much higher and 
the resource was sustained. (v) In some potentially cooperative situations humans’ 
meet partners from outside the own social group. These “strangers” have a 
reputation that they have built in another social group. Do humans put a different 
value on a strangers’ reputation in comparison to the reputation of members of the 
own social group? It was shown that it is not relevant if the reputation was built within 
the own or in a foreign social group. 
 In summary we found the following: Humans behave uncooperatively, when it 
is to the personal advantage. However, certain circumstances lead to cooperative 
behavior in humans. Reputation building is one of the most important mechanisms in 
this context, which enables us to cooperate even with not related strangers. However 
humans consciously make strategic use of situations where they do not harm their 
reputation by behaving uncooperatively. Nevertheless, even in completely 
anonymous situations it is possible to create circumstances, like introducing optional 
participation in the public goods situations, which promote cooperative behavior in 
humans. 
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Die Biologie liefert mit der Evolutionstheorie ein starkes grundlegendes 
Erklärungsmodell für das Entstehen von kooperativem Verhalten. Kooperatives 
Verhalten zwischen verwandten Individuen kann detailliert durch die Theorie der 
Verwandtenselektion erklärt werden. Helfen Verwandte einander, verschafft der 
Helfer dem Empfänger einen Vorteil und erhöht damit die relative 
Wahrscheinlichkeit, daß Kopien seiner eignen Gene in den nächsten Generationen 
häufiger vertreten sein werden. Durch Verwandtenselektion konnten jedoch 
Beispiele von scheinbarem Altruismus nicht erklärt werden, da diese zwischen nicht 
verwandten Individuen statt finden. Die meisten dieser Beispiele ließen sich erst mit 
der Formulierung der Theorie des reziproken Altruismus erklären. Wird einer Person 
geholfen, und die Hilfe wird vom Empfänger später erwidert, dann spricht man von 
reziprokem Verhalten. Doch welche anderen Mechanismen führen zu Kooperation 
und erhalten Kooperation in einem bestehenden System?  
In meiner Dissertation habe ich neue Modelle zu kooperativem Verhalten 
zwischen nicht verwandten Individuen beim Menschen empirisch getestet. Dies ist 
besonders wichtig, weil wir uns in einem Beziehungsnetz bewegen, in dem 
Kooperation zwischen nicht verwandten Partnern eine zentrale Rolle spielt. 
Moderne, menschliche Gesellschaften sind ohne die Kooperation zwischen nicht 
verwandten Individuen nicht mehr vorstellbar. Wenn die Rahmenbedingungen für 
Kooperation zwischen nicht verwandten Menschen gefunden worden sind, wird man 
in der Lage sein Entscheidungsmuster in der Politik, Wirtschaft und im privaten 
Leben zu verstehen und positiv zu beeinflussen. Die Beeinflussung erfolgt indem 
man die Rahmenbedingungen  anpaßt.  
Die zentrale Rolle der Kooperation zwischen nicht verwandten Partnern im 
menschlichen Alltag ist uns häufig nicht bewußt. Dieses geschieht z.B. wenn zwei 
Personen gleichzeitig auf eine schmale Tür zugehen. Hier kommt es zwischen 
beiden Personen in aller Regel zu einer kooperativen Einigung, wer zuerst durch 
diese Tür gehen darf. In einigen Berufen, wie z.B. bei der Feuerwehr, kann 
unkooperatives Verhalten durch die nicht verwandten Kollegen jemanden das Leben 
oder die Gesundheit kosten. Für diese Situationen zwischen nicht verwandten 
Individuen muß es Strategien geben, welche evolutionär stabil sind. Andernfalls 
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würden wir kooperatives Verhalten heutzutage nur sehr selten und fast 
ausschließlich zwischen verwandten Individuen finden. Dies bedeutet, daß es 
Strategien geben muß die ihrem Träger, indem er sich kooperativ verhält, einen 
Vorteil verschaffen. 
Ökonomen und Biologen sind seit langem sehr an der Entstehung und der 
Stabilität von kooperativem Verhalten interessiert. Erst mit der Einführung der 
Spieltheorie bot sich eine mathematische Grundlage, um diese Form von 
Kooperation in die bestehenden evolutionsbiologischen Modelle zu integrieren. Mit 
Hilfe der Spieltheorie konnten nun Vorhersagen gemacht werden, unter welchen 
Bedingungen bestimmte Verhaltensweisen entstehen können, und durch welche 
grundlegenden Mechanismen diese Verhaltensweisen erhalten bleiben. 
In dieser Dissertation habe ich mit Hilfe spieltheoretischer Modelle, empirisch 
die Randbedingungen untersucht, welche kooperatives Verhalten zwischen nicht 
verwandten Menschen fördern. Die Haupterkenntnisse meiner Arbeit sind die 
Folgenden: (i) Menschen spenden häufig zu wohltätigen Zwecken. Dabei entstehen 
ihnen Kosten und damit reduzieren sie ihre persönliche Fitneß. Es erscheint auf den 
ersten Blick zum Nachteil eines Trägers dieses Verhaltensmerkmals. Diese 
Verhaltensweise muß jedoch zum Vorteil des Spenders sein, da ansonsten 
evolutionäre Prozesse dafür sorgen würden, daß dies Verhalten aus einer 
Bevölkerung eliminiert wird. Die Studie zeigte, daß der Vorteil darin besteht, daß die 
persönliche Reputation innerhalb der eigenen sozialen Gruppe durch Spenden (in 
unserem Experiment an UNICEF) steigt. Es stellte sich heraus, daß Personen, die 
viel an UNICEF gespendet haben, mit höherer Wahrscheinlichkeit Hilfe von anderen 
bekamen und bevorzugt zu Repräsentanten der Gruppe gewählt wurden. (ii) 
Reputation ist eine wichtige Währung bei indirekter Reziprozität. Daher ist es 
wahrscheinlich, daß Menschen auch in anderen sozialen Interaktionen 
Reputationspflege betreiben, wenn die hier geschaffene Reputation auch in 
indirekten Reziprozitätssituationen bekannt ist. Normalerweise werden limitierte 
Gemeinschaftsressourcen, die ohne Beschränkungen der Allgemeinheit zugänglich 
sind, von Menschen übernutzt. Ist es möglich, diese Gemeinschaftsressourcen zu 
erhalten, in dem man die Nutzung einer solchen Ressource mit der persönlichen 
Reputation verknüpft? Es zeigte sich, daß die Gefahr des Reputationsverlustes 
durch eine Übernutzung der Gemeinschaftsressource tatsächlich dazu führte, daß 
diese erhalten wurde. Die Gemeinschaftsressource wurde nicht nur erhalten, 
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sondern sie war überraschend produktiv für die Gruppenmitglieder. (iii) Ein 
theoretisches Modell beinhaltete eine neue Möglichkeit eine 
Gemeinschaftsressource zu erhalten und Menschen dazu zu bewegen, miteinander 
zu kooperieren. Die Möglichkeit sich nicht an der Gemeinschaftsressource zu 
beteiligen, sondern statt dessen eine individuelle, nicht so ergiebige Ressource zu 
nutzen, sollte dazu führen, daß ein immerwährender Dominanzwechsel zwischen 
drei Strategien ((a) nicht an der Gruppe teilnehmen, die die Gruppenressource 
nutzen kann, (b) teilzunehmen und nicht zu kooperieren oder (c) teilzunehmen und 
zu kooperieren) in einer Population entsteht. Dieser Effekt entsteht dadurch, daß 
sobald sich die Mehrzahl der Individuen für eine bestimmte Strategie entscheidet, 
der mögliche Profit höher bei einer der beiden anderen Strategien ist. Diese Dynamik 
entspricht der des bekannten Kinderspiels „Stein-Schere-Papier“. Durch die 
anhaltende Dynamik und die immerwiederkehrende Kooperation wird die Ressource 
erhalten. Reicht es aus, Menschen die Möglichkeit zu geben, nicht an der 
Gruppenressource teilzunehmen, um Kooperation entstehen zu lassen? Die 
Dynamik entstand wie vorhergesagt. Es gab einen steten Dominanzwechsel der drei 
Strategien in der Gruppe, womit sich immer wieder kooperative Phasen ergaben und 
die Ressource erhalten wurde. (iv) Wird in einer Situation, in der zeitweilig die 
Entscheidung eine Gemeinschaftsressource zu nutzen mit Reputation verknüpft ist, 
es zu anderen Zeiten aber möglich ist zu entscheiden ohne die Reputation zu 
schädigen, dieses Wissen strategisch verwendet? In dieser Studie wurde 
festgestellt, daß Menschen sehr bewußt Reputationsirrelevante Situationen für sich 
nutzen und sich hier zu ihrem persönlichen Vorteil unkooperativ verhalten. Waren die 
Entscheidungen jedoch mit Reputation verknüpft, wurden die Entscheidungen sehr 
viel kooperativer, und in diesen Phasen wurde wie zuvor die 
Gemeinschaftsressource nicht übernutzt. (v) Es gibt Situationen in denen Menschen 
auf mögliche Kooperationspartner treffen, die aus einer anderen Gemeinschaft 
kommen. Diese „Fremden“ haben in ihrer eigenen Gruppe eine Reputation 
aufgebaut. Wird diese Reputation anders bewertet als die Reputation von Personen 
aus der eigenen Gemeinschaft? Es konnte gezeigt werden, daß es nicht 
entscheidend ist, ob ein Partner seine Reputation in der eigenen Gruppe oder in 
einer fremden Gruppe aufgebaut hatte. Es ist nur nötig, daß die Information über die 
Reputation zur Verfügung steht. 
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Zusammenfassend ergibt sich folgendes Bild: Wenn es zu ihrem persönlichen 
Vorteil ist, verhalten sich Menschen unkooperativ. Es gibt jedoch Randbedingungen 
die menschliche Kooperation fördern. Reputation ist ein sehr wichtiger Mechanismus 
in diesem Zusammenhang. Reputationsbildung ermöglicht es uns auch mit fremden, 
nicht verwandten Personen tagtäglich zu kooperieren. Menschen nutzen strategisch 
Situationen, in denen sie ihre Reputation nicht schädigen, zu ihrem persönlichen 
Vorteil aus. Jedoch selbst in völlig anonymen Situationen kann durch besondere 
Rahmenbedingungen, wie freiwilliges Teilnehmen an einer Gemeinschaft, 
Kooperation in einer sonst unkooperativen Situation gefördert werden.  
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In this general introduction I will present the theoretical and methodological tools 
necessary to perform the experiments of the chapters I-V.  
1  COOPERATION 
 
Cooperative behavior is widely spread throughout the animal kingdom. Many species 
such as apes, lions, ancestral and modern humans are hunting in groups. The 
evolutionary puzzle of the emergence and sustainability of cooperative behavior 
within populations of selfish individuals is usually explained through kin selection 
(Hamilton, 1964b), group selection (Wilson and Sober, 1994), reciprocal altruism 
(Trivers, 1971) and mutualism (Brown, 1983; Connor, 1995). However, these models 
could not fully explain cooperation between non-related individuals, which modern 
human societies so strongly depend on the cooperation between individuals who are 
not related. Only recently it has been shown theoretically (Leimar and Hammerstein, 
2001; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998b) that cooperation can evolve through indirect 
reciprocity, and empirically (Milinski et al., 2001; Wedekind and Milinski, 2000) that 
human subjects cooperate in indirect reciprocity situations (see also next section – 2 
Game Theory) through reputation building. Punishment has been identified as 
another effective way of establishing cooperation between unrelated individuals 
(Boyd and Richerson, 1992; Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Gintis, 2000b; Sigmund et al., 
2001). In addition several authors suggested that costly signaling could possibly 
provide an explanation for cooperation (Gintis et al., 2001; Leimar and Hammerstein, 
2001; Roberts, 1998; Zahavi, 1995).  
However, under some circumstances humans do not behave cooperatively. 
The anonymous use of limited resource with open access to everyone leads to an 
overuse of this resource, so that it cannot be sustained. Examples for such social 
dilemmas are unmanaged fish stock or hygiene in highly anonymous public places 
such as train stations. These situations are known as public goods situations (see 
also next section – 2 Game Theory). In empirical experiments the basic conditions of 
public goods situation are altered in order to find cooperative solutions, as I describe 
in the experiments of the chapters II - V. 
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2  GAME THEORY 
 
Economist, social scientists and theorists have studied the problem of cooperative 
behavior in humans often using game theory as a tool for their investigations. J. v. 
Neumann and O. Morgenstern founded game theory in 1944 as a tool to predict the 
possible behavior of cybernetic systems (systems that have the ability to self 
regulate through feedback mechanisms when they are disturbed) in conflicting 
situations with the help of probability calculations. In this thesis I used two theoretical 
games. The first is the generally cooperative game of indirect reciprocity and the 
second is the usually uncooperative public goods game.  
 
 
Indirect reciprocity 
 
Indirect reciprocity 
is an extension of direct 
reciprocity, where a donor 
gives help to a receiver 
and the receiver returns 
the help to the donor in 
the future (fig. 2.1). Nice 
indicators for the presence of direct reciprocity in human societies are sayings such 
as “if you scratch my back I will 
scratch yours”. However, when 
direct reciprocity is excluded, so 
that the help cannot be returned 
by the receiver to the original 
donor, then it might be possible to 
help a third person, whereby the 
help may return indirectly to the 
original donor, which is then 
called indirect reciprocity (Fig 2.2). 
As an example Yellow gives help 
Fig. 2.1 Direct reciprocity: Blue helps Yellow and vice versa 
Fig. 2.2 Indirect reciprocity: Yellow helps Gray, Blue
helps Yellow and Gray helps Blue. 
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to Gray who cannot return the help to Yellow, but Yellow is instead helped by Blue. 
Later Gray is able to help Blue, so that the help is returned indirectly. The biblical 
saying “give and you shall receive” is a nice example for indirect reciprocity. 
It is known from theoretical and empirical work that humans cooperate in 
indirect reciprocity situations through reputation building. It has been shown 
theoretically and empirically that people who have given in the past are more likely to 
receive help in the future than people who refused to help (Nowak and Sigmund, 
1998a; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998b; Wedekind and Milinski, 2000).  
 
 
Public goods 
 
The public goods games has first been described by Hardin as the “Tragedy 
of the Commons” (Hardin, 1968). The classic example of a public goods game 
consists of four players who can contribute money (e.g. one Euro) into a public pool 
(the public resource). The players can decide anonymously if they want to contribute. 
The content of the pool is then doubled and paid evenly to all players irrespectively 
of their contributions into the public pool. This situation is a social dilemma, because 
there is a conflict between the group interest and the individuals’ interest. The group 
stands best if all players contribute into the pool, then the group doubles its 
investment. However, the rational individual player should never contribute into the 
pool at all. The Euro paid into the public pool is doubled and then divided by four 
players. The investor receives only a return of 0.50 Cents and therefore only half of 
the investment.  
Nevertheless Experiments with human subjects usually start highly 
cooperative, but when the game is played repeatedly the cooperation declines over 
time towards zero.  
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3   GENERAL APPROACH TO TESTING 
 
All five experiments where carried out at the Universities of Bonn, Hamburg and Kiel, 
with first semester students from the biological faculties. Every experiment was done 
in cooperation with M. Milinski and H.-J. Krambeck. Furthermore T.C.M. Bakker was 
involved in the experiment described in chapter I. All volunteers from the biological 
first semester lectures, received a postal card with their appointed time and the room 
number, where the experiment would take place. Up to this point the students only 
knew that they would participate in an experiment, that they would play a simple 
group game and would receive money for doing so.  
 When all volunteers had arrived they received an oral introduction. In this 
introduction we explained the use of the buttons for their decisions and that they 
would be completely anonymous throughout the game. The participants were also 
told that they should try to maximize their personal payoff throughout the game. 
Every participant was seated between separations (Fig. 3.1-3.3) and had a personal 
decision box with silent YES and NO buttons (Fig. 3.2). Additionally every participant 
received a pseudoname for the time of the game. To assure the anonymity, the 
participants had to choose their personal connecting cable from a bunch of similar 
Fig. 3.1 Experimental setup: the experimenters’ viewpoint with the controlling laptop
computer in front. 
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cables, lying on the floor. The cables where disconnected after the game and 
intermixed. Finally, the participants where told that the computer program would start 
with a text introduction explaining the exact rules of the game (see Appendix). The 
complete game was displayed on a large screen in the front (Fig. 3.2, Fig. 3.3), so 
that complete information was accessible to all participants at all times. Throughout 
the experiment the experimenters were seated behind separations (Fig. 3.1), so that 
the players did not feel observed while playing the game. After each group had 
completed their game, the participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire to better 
understand the particular logic applied by the participants throughout the 
experiments and to make sure they had understood the important rules of their 
specific game. The procedure of handing out the money that each participant had 
accumulated on her account had to insure the anonymity of the participants. For that 
reason we set up a kind of polling booth, where envelopes with the pseudonames of 
each participant containing the money that the computer program had calculated as 
the final amount, were spread out. Every participant had to step alone into the booth 
and take out all the money from the envelope with her pseudoname and return the 
empty envelope to the exact place where it had been before. In this way it was 
assured that the second participant would not know the pseudoname of the first 
participant and the last but one would not know the pseudoname of the last 
participant. Additionally, it was insured that the experimenters would not be able to 
Fig. 3.2 Experimental setup: view from behind the participants toward the large
screen 
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link a pseudoname to a specific participant. Since it was also insured that the 
experimenters would not be able to trace any pseudoname back to a specific 
participant at any time, the experiment was conducted double blind. After all 
participants had received their money they were once more told not to talk about the 
experiment to others in order not to influence future participants. Furthermore, they 
were not allowed to tell their pseudoname to anyone in the future and were asked to 
forget this name if possible. All this was done so that the players could build up a 
new reputation exclusively by playing the game. Retaliation of uncooperative 
behavior or reward of cooperative behavior should be exclusively linked to the 
reputation that the players had achieved within the game.  
 
Fig. 3.3 Experimental setup: view from behind a single
player 
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4   THESIS OUTLINE 
 
This thesis is subdivided into 5 chapters. Each chapter is a single experiment 
investigating a new aspect of human cooperative behavior. This outline gives a short 
overview of the aim of each study and how it was tested. 
 
Chapter I 
In the first chapter I discuss the question why humans donate money to charity 
organizations. On first sight this seems to be an altruistic act. The direct fitness of the 
donator is reduced while the direct fitness of the recipient is increased. This is 
especially when the recipient is someone on a different continent (e.g. European 
charity organizations who collect money for aid in Africa). Reputation is known to be 
a strong force to establish cooperation in indirect reciprocity situations. The idea was 
that by making the donations to charity public they could possibly add to the 
individuals’ reputation. Therefore we alternated in the experiment the donations to 
charity with indirect reciprocity rounds. In the indirect reciprocity rounds we displayed 
how the potential receiver had decided in past indirect reciprocity rounds and when 
she had donated to charity. After the experiment the participants voted whom of the 
other participants they would choose to be their group representative. We tested in 
this study whether donations to charity increased the likelihood of receiving from 
other players and in addition increase the likelihood of being voted the group 
representative.  
 
Chapter II 
In this chapter I investigate whether making decisions in public goods games 
reputation relevant can alter the usual uncooperative outcome of these games. In the 
experiment we alternated indirect reciprocity rounds with public goods rounds. In 
every indirect reciprocity round we displayed all past decisions of a potential receiver 
in the indirect reciprocity rounds and the public goods rounds. The prediction of this 
study was that the players would increase their donations into the public good in 
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order to protect their good reputation for the indirect reciprocity games. Thereby the 
public good would be sustained and the group as a whole would benefit. 
 
Chapter III 
In the third chapter my aim was to investigate if it is possible to find a cooperative 
solution in the social dilemma of public goods even under complete anonymity and 
therefore the exclusion of reputation. A theoretical model (Hauert et al., 2002b) 
predicted that optional participation in the public goods should produce this effect. In 
this experiment each player has the choice between three strategies. First one could 
join the group and here could either cooperate (play as ”cooperator”) with a cost to 
pay for the cooperative act or to defect (play as “defector”) with no costs. The payoff 
depended in both cases on the number of players that had joined the group and how 
many of these players had decided to cooperate. The third strategy was not to 
participate in the group (play as “loner”) with a low but fixed payoff at the end of the 
round. Through this escape option from the social dilemma all three strategies were 
predicted to rise consecutively in an ongoing dynamic. This was predicted because 
whenever one strategy is the dominant choice within the group one of the other two 
strategies has a higher payoff, which we tested in a game with students. 
 
Chapter IV 
In the fourth chapter I looked at strategic behavior depending on the knowledge of 
being recognizable in a different social context or not being recognizable. Again as in 
chapter II the students played public goods and indirect reciprocity rounds. However 
in this experiment each participant had two different identities. The first name was as 
before used in the indirect reciprocity and in some public goods rounds. The 
decisions in the public goods rounds done with the first name would then be shown 
in all future indirect reciprocity rounds and were therefore linked to the individuals’ 
reputation. Whereas the second name was used exclusively in the remaining public 
goods rounds and the decisions were therefore not linked to the reputation in the 
indirect reciprocity rounds. We tested whether the participants used this information 
strategically. Predicting that they would reduce their cooperation with the second 
name, while increasing cooperation when making decisions with the first name in 
public goods rounds.  
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Chapter V 
The purpose of my final chapter was to show the value of a good reputation inside 
and outside the own social group. While we could confirm in chapter I, II and IV that 
a good reputation within the own social group is highly valuable it was not known if 
this reputation is valuable outside the own social group. In this empirical study we let 
students play again public goods and indirect reciprocity games. The difference was 
that now there were two groups playing together all public goods rounds. For the 
indirect reciprocity rounds some of the players were exchanged between the two 
groups and these newly formed groups played all indirect reciprocity rounds 
together. Thereby the individual player had some players he was playing with in both 
situation and some players he would exclusively meet in either public goods or 
indirect reciprocity rounds. We tested here whether the participants treated the 
players who did not play in their own public goods group differently from the others in 
the indirect reciprocity rounds.   
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I  DONORS TO CHARITY GAIN IN BOTH INDIRECT RECIPROCITY AND 
POLITICAL REPUTATION 
 
 
 
Summary 
Darwinian evolution can explain human cooperative behaviour among non-kin by 
either direct or indirect reciprocity. In the latter case one does not expect a return for 
an altruistic act from the recipient as with direct reciprocity, but from another member 
of the social group. However, the wide spread human behaviour of donating to poor 
people outside the social group, e.g. to charity organisations, that are unlikely to 
reciprocate indirectly and thus are equivalent to defectors in the game is still an 
evolutionary puzzle. We show here experimentally that donations made in public to a 
well-known relief organisation resulted both in increased income that the donors 
received from the members of their group and in enhanced political reputation: they 
were favoured to represent the interests of their group. Donations may thus function 
as honest signal for one's social reliability. 
 
 
Introduction 
It has been a longstanding evolutionary problem to understand how egoists can 
maximise their fitness by helping unrelated conspecifics (Nowak and Sigmund, 
2000). Evolutionary theorists have developed mainly two concepts: direct and 
indirect reciprocity. In direct reciprocity (Axelrod, 1984; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; 
Milinski and Wedekind, 1998; Trivers, 1971) someone receives help and thereby 
gains more than the help costs the donor. If the help is reciprocated on the next 
occasion, each player has a net benefit. For indirect reciprocity (Alexander, 1987; 
Zahavi, 1991; Zahavi, 1995) support is given to individuals who have helped others. 
Both computer simulations and analytical models proved that indirect reciprocity can 
be evolutionarily stable (Leimar and Hammerstein, 2001; Lotem et al., 1999; Nowak 
and Sigmund, 1998a; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998b) and humans use it within their 
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social group (Milinski et al., 2001; Milinski et al., 2002b, chapter II; Seinen and 
Schram, 2001; Wedekind and Milinski, 2000). Similarly, in the solidarity game 
players offer support to potential losers within the social group (Selten and 
Ockenfels, 1998). If, however, donations are given to non-members of the group, 
e.g. to charity organisations that help people in other countries, this kind of altruism 
may or may not be part of the indirect reciprocity game.  
Since indirect reciprocity involves reputation and status (Alexander, 1987; 
Zahavi, 1991; Zahavi, 1995), a donation that is made in public may work as a 
conspicuous honest signal of a person’s ability to participate in indirect reciprocity, or 
as Alexander (1986, p.100) put it: “In complex social systems with much reciprocity, 
being judged as attractive for reciprocal interactions may become an essential 
ingredient for success”. Making donations in public to charity could in this way be 
explained by evolutionary theory. If acts of giving reveal important aspects of 
individual quality, there is the possibility that this information could be used also in 
other contexts (Leimar and Hammerstein, 2001; Zahavi, 1995), e.g. when deciding 
upon the delegation of powers to a person. 
 
Methods 
We tested these hypotheses with 72 students that participated in 12 groups of 7 
subjects each in a computerised experiment. Each person had a starting account of 
DM 35 (about £17), and was anonymous with a pseudo-name (i.e., a name of a 
moon of our solar system). In each of the 16 rounds of the game each subject was 
assigned to be a potential receiver once and a potential donor twice, i.e. he/she was 
asked whether he/she would donate to a member of the group and thereafter to 
donate to charity. For example, a potential donor, say “Telesto”, was asked whether 
he would give to “Galatea”. Telesto would loose DM 2.50 from his account and 
Galatea would gain DM 4 on her account if Telesto decided YES. Telesto’s decision 
(YES or NO) was displayed for 2s on a big screen which all participants could see all 
the time. Thereafter Telesto was asked whether he would give DM 2.50 to the relief 
organisation “UNICEF”, which if YES would receive DM 4. This decision was also 
displayed for 2s. It was made clear that the money on UNICEF’s account would be 
sent to UNICEF. Everybody was provided with information on whether everybody 
else, e.g. Galatea, had given in previous rounds (to other subjects and/or to 
UNICEF) when she/he had been in the role of the potential donor. The subjects knew 
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that there would be no direct reciprocity. One student in each group had been 
secretly instructed by us to alternate YES and NO when asked to give to other 
players and, when asked to give UNICEF, to decide always YES (“YES-player”) in 6 
groups and always NO (“NO-player”) in the other 6 groups. After the 16th round each 
subject was given a ballot and asked to elect a member of the group (pseudo-name) 
as a potential delegate in the students’ council. This election had not been 
announced. Every subject received the money from his/her account anonymously 
after the experiment. 
 
Results and Discussion 
The subjects cooperated by indirect reciprocity, i.e. they received the more money 
the more they had given to others themselves (Fig. I.1). The amount of money given 
to others did not correlate significantly with the number of donations to charity 
(UNICEF) (r2 = 0.006, df = 
72, P >0.5, two-tailed, “YES” 
and “NO-players” excluded). 
However, those who had 
donated more to UNICEF 
received relatively more from 
other players (red dots in 
Fig. I.1), whereas those who 
had donated less to UNICEF 
received relatively less from 
other players (blue dots). To 
avoid pseudo-replication, the 
regression of donations to 
UNICEF on the residuals 
from the relationship 
“donations to others, 
donations received” was 
calculated for each group of 7 subjects separately, “YES” and “NO-players” 
excluded. The resulting 12 regression coefficients were on average (r = 0.36 + 0.11) 
significantly positive (Wilcoxon one-sample test against 0, z= 2.59, P <0.01, two-
tailed). Donations to UNICEF thus paid off through indirect reciprocity. Similarly, the 
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Fig. I.1 Human subjects received money indirectly related to
the amount they gave to others (i.e. the more they gave to
others the more they received; n =72, t = 3.71, P = 0.0004,
two-tailed). The solid line depicts linear regression. Red
circles are charitable donors (UNICEF) who gave more than
the median, blue circles are donors who gave less than the
median, and gray circles are median donors. 
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6 “UNICEF-NO-players” received significantly more NOs from their donors (52 + 
11%) than did the 6 “YES-players” (30 + 3%, Mann-Whitney U-test, z = 1.93, P = 
0.033, directed). UNICEF-YES-players thus received on average DM 12.80 more 
than UNICEF-NO-players; both types of pseudo-player did not differ in the amount 
they had donated to other players. 
The sum of donations to UNICEF and to other players correlated positively 
with the number of votes that the subjects received in the election for the students’ 
council (Fig. I.2) (Spearman correlation, n = 84, z = 2.84, P<0.005, two-tailed). Since 
voting was by secret ballot and had not been announced we treat each subject as a 
statistical unit; the YES- 
and NO-players 
received votes but did 
not vote themselves. 
The number of 
donations to UNICEF 
(irrespective of the 
number of donations to 
other players) correlated 
positively with the 
number of votes 
received (regression of 
the number of votes 
received on the 
residuals from the 
relationship “donations to other players, donations to UNICEF”, n = 84, t = 2.60, P = 
0.01, two-tailed). Similarly, the UNICEF-YES-players received 8 votes whereas the 
NO-players obtained only 3 votes. However, the number of donations to other 
players (irrespective of the number of donations to UNICEF) did not correlate 
significantly with the number of votes received (regression of the number of votes 
received on the residuals from the relationship “donations to UNICEF, donations to 
other players”, n = 84, t = 1.58, P = 0.12, two-tailed).  This suggests that donations to 
charity have a stronger influence on political reputation than have donations to 
members of the group. This is corroborated by the finding that UNICEF-YES-players 
received on average about three times as many votes as did UNICEF-NO-players. 
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Fig. I.2 The number of votes the human subjects received in a
staged poll for the students´ council was directly related to the
amount they had donated to charity (UNICEF) and to the other
players. The solid line depicts linear regression and circles of
increasing size depict one to four subjects per data point. 
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However, each DM invested to charity by a UNICEF-YES-player gave a return of 
only DM 0.33 from indirect reciprocity. It might therefore be worth investing in both 
indirect reciprocity to gain primarily help from others and in charity to gain primarily 
another type of social reputation.  
We have recently shown that the need to maintain reputation in the indirect 
reciprocity game can raise the level of contribution to a ‘public good’ considerably 
when both types of social dilemma are alternated (Milinski et al., 2002b, chapter II).  
It is possible that high reputation gained by donations to charity would further 
facilitate cooperation in a “tragedy of the commons”. If it is made public that all 
participants of a public goods game did not give to charity, we would predict that the 
game starts already uncooperatively. 
Our results show that donations to a relief organisation can pay off through 
both indirect reciprocity and increased reputation in another context, e.g. political 
eligibility. This result is compatible with Alexander’s (1986) arguments: “Systems of 
indirect reciprocity, and therefore moral systems, are social systems structured 
around the importance of status...  Status can be determined by physical prowess, 
as in those non-human (animal) dominance hierarchies in which coalitions are 
absent or (as in humans) by mental or social prowess. Mental and social prowess, in 
this sense, includes (as in moral systems) effectiveness and reliability in reciprocity 
and cooperation.” It might (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998b) and, as we found, does pay 
to “advertise” cooperation. However, although donating to those who are in need 
might serve as an honest and efficient (because it is done in public) signal for one’s 
reliability in reciprocity, this situation seems exploitable by defectors as has been 
masterly described by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle in one of his short stories (Conan 
Doyle, 1986). We proposed UNICEF for donations because its trustworthiness is 
beyond all doubt. Had we offered a less trustworthy organisation, donations to it 
might not have been as effective in raising a donor’s status. This may depict a new 
dimension in the evolutionary arms race between cooperators and defectors in the 
tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968; Ostrom et al., 1999).  
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II  REPUTATION HELPS SOLVE THE 'TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS'  
 
 
 
The problem of sustaining a public resource that everybody is free to overuse - the 
'tragedy of the commons' (Berkes et al., 1989; Dawes, 1980; Hardin, 1968; Hardin, 
1998; Ledyard, 1995; Ostrom, 1999; Ostrom et al., 1999) - emerges in many social 
dilemmas, such as our inability to sustain the global climate. Public goods 
experiments (Ledyard, 1995), which are used to study this type of problem, usually 
confirm that the collective benefit will not be produced. Because individuals and 
countries often participate in several social games simultaneously, the interaction of 
these games may provide a sophisticated way by which to maintain the public 
resource. Indirect reciprocity (Alexander, 1987), 'give and you shall receive', is built 
on reputation and can sustain a high level of cooperation, as shown by game 
theorists (Lotem et al., 1999; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998a; Nowak and Sigmund, 
1998b). Here we show, through alternating rounds of public goods and indirect 
reciprocity games, that the need to maintain reputation for indirect reciprocity 
maintains contributions to the public good at an unexpectedly high level. But if 
rounds of indirect reciprocation are not expected, then contributions to the public 
good drop quickly to zero. Alternating the games leads to higher profits for all 
players. As reputation may be a currency that is valid in many social games, our 
approach could be used to test social dilemmas for their solubility. 
 
 
Since Hardin (Hardin, 1968) first described the 'tragedy of the commons', this type of 
social dilemma has been studied extensively by political and social scientists, 
economists and evolutionary theorists (Berkes et al., 1989; Dawes, 1980; Hardin, 
1998; Ledyard, 1995; Ostrom, 1999; Ostrom et al., 1999). Many of the experiments 
that have been carried out are a variant of the standard design (Ledyard, 1995). In 
this model, four students seated at a table are each given an endowment of £5. They 
are then told that they can each choose to invest some or all of their £5 in a group 
project by putting, without discussion, an amount between £0 and £5 in an envelope. 
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The experimenter will collect the 'contributions', total them up, double the amount, 
and then divide this money among the group. 
The economic/game-theory prediction is that no one will ever contribute 
anything because each £1 contributed yields only £0.50 to its contributor, no matter 
what the others do. This is a public goods problem because the group would be best 
off (taking home £10 each) if all contributed £5. But individual self-interest is at odds 
with group interest. Usually people cooperate more than is predicted by standard 
economic theory (Ledyard, 1995); however, observed cooperation is heterogeneous 
and declines over time (Fischbacher et al., 2001). It has been shown that direct 
punishment of non-cooperators can cause a rise in the level of the average 
contribution to the public good (Boyd and Richerson, 1992; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; 
Gintis, 2000a), and cooperators are even prepared to pay a cost for punishing 
('altruistic punishment')(Fehr and Gächter, 2002). 
We present an alternative way to maintain potentially a high level of 
contribution to the public good. It can be achieved through interaction with a second 
game that promises rewards for those with a good reputation in the public goods 
game. Theorists have shown that cooperation through indirect reciprocity can evolve 
(Lotem et al., 1999; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998a; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998b). For 
indirect reciprocity, individuals who have helped others are given support, whereby 
the supporter builds up reputation (Alexander, 1987; Zahavi, 1991) or a positive 
image score (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998a; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998b). 
Experimental studies have confirmed that human subjects preferentially help others 
who have a positive image score (Milinski et al., 2001; Seinen and Schram, 2001; 
Wedekind and Milinski, 2000). As players would risk their reputation if they would not 
cooperate in a public goods game that is alternated with the indirect reciprocity 
game, we predicted that alternating rounds of these two games would induce 
continuous cooperation in the public goods game, in contrast to a situation in which 
all public goods rounds were played first. 
We tested these predictions with 114 first-year students who participated in 19 
groups of 6 subjects each in a computerized experiment. The six subjects of each 
group could see a public screen on which instructions and the actual game was 
projected. They were told, first, that each person had a starting account of DM 20 
(£10) and could gain or lose money dependent on his/her and the participants' 
decisions; second, that all decisions were anonymous and each player would be 
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assigned a pseudoname (that is, a new identity) for the whole game; and last, that 
they would play in two different situations, an 'indirect reciprocity game' and a 'public 
goods game'. 
Ten groups played one round of indirect reciprocity in which each subject was 
a potential donor once and a potential receiver once, and then one round of public 
goods. This alternating pattern was continued until round 16, thereafter four rounds 
of public goods were played. Every second group was told in round 17 that from then 
on only public goods rounds would follow until the end of the game. Nine other 
groups played eight rounds of public goods, followed by eight rounds of indirect 
reciprocity, followed by four rounds of public goods. Again, every second group was 
told in round 17 that from then on only public goods rounds would follow until the end 
of the game. In each round of an indirect reciprocity game, each potential receiver's 
history of giving both in the indirect reciprocity and the public goods game was 
displayed simultaneously for all players. 
In groups that started with eight rounds of the public goods game initial 
cooperation declined as is usual in this type of game from round one to round eight 
(paired t-test between first and eighth round of public goods game, n = 9 groups, t = 
6.958, P < 0.0001; Fig. II.1). During the subsequent eight rounds of pairwise indirect 
reciprocity, cooperation was instantaneously re-established (comparison between 
eighth round of public goods game and first round of indirect reciprocity: paired t-test, 
n = 9 groups, t = 2.9, P < 0.02; to avoid pseudoreplication we use each group of six 
subjects as our statistical unit throughout this paper; all probabilities are two-tailed). 
But in groups that started with one round of indirect reciprocity, followed by 
one round of public goods, and so on until round 16, the initial high cooperation level 
of the public goods game did not decline during the eight rounds of the public goods 
game (comparison between the first and the eighth round of public goods game; 
paired t-test, n = 10 groups, t = 0.897, P = 0.40), and was on average considerably 
higher than the cooperation level of the nine groups that had started with eight 
rounds of public goods (unpaired t-test, d.f. = 17, t = 4.83, P < 0.0002; Fig. II.1). 
When public goods and indirect reciprocity rounds were alternated, the public goods 
game elicited significantly more cooperation than the indirect reciprocity game 
(comparison between average cooperation of eight rounds public goods and eight 
rounds indirect reciprocity; paired t-test, n = 10 groups, t = 3.99, P < 0.004). 
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The high cooperation level in the public goods game was probably maintained 
in the following 
way. Players 
might have 
withheld help 
in the pairwise 
indirect 
reciprocity 
game from 
players who 
had refused to 
give in the 
preceding 
public goods 
round. The 
probability of 
receiving 'no' 
in the indirect 
reciprocity 
game was 
significantly 
higher for 
players that 
had refused to 
give in the preceding public goods round than for those who had given (Fig. II.2a). 
Similarly, we found a positive correlation between the probability of receiving 'no' in 
the first round of the indirect reciprocity game and the rate of refused help during the 
block of eight rounds of the public goods game (mean Spearman's r per group = 
0.49; s.e.m. = 0.15; Wilcoxon test against 0, n = 9 groups, z = -2.1, P < 0.04). 
Fig. II.1 Percentage of cooperation (‘yes') per group of six subjects in each
round of the public goods game (filled symbols) and in each round of the
indirect reciprocity game (open symbols). In one treatment, the groups
alternated between rounds of indirect reciprocity and rounds of public goods
until round 16 (blue); in the other treatment, groups started with eight
consecutive rounds of the public goods game and continued with eight rounds
of the indirect reciprocity game (red); in rounds 17-20, groups of both
treatments played the public goods game, which was either announced, ‘from
now on only this type of game until the end' (squares), or not announced
(diamonds). 
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The hypothesis that 
interaction with the indirect 
reciprocity game keeps up 
cooperation in the public goods 
game is directly tested by the 
four rounds of public goods that 
groups in both treatments 
played in rounds 17–20. Every 
second group was told in round 
17 that from then on only public 
goods rounds would follow until 
the end of the game. In these 
groups cooperation declined 
during the four public goods 
rounds, whereas cooperation 
was maintained when the risk of 
further rounds of indirect 
reciprocity was not excluded 
(Fig. II.1; comparison of mean 
cooperation level during four 
rounds of public goods between 
five groups 'with' and five 
groups 'without announcement' 
after the alternating treatment, 
d.f. = 8, unpaired t-test, t = 
4.456, P = 0.002, and between 
five groups 'with' and four 
groups 'without announcement' 
after the block treatment, d.f. = 
7, unpaired t-test, t = 6.631, P = 
0.0003). Thus, the pending risk of further rounds of indirect reciprocity prevented 
cooperation in the public goods game from declining at least over four consecutive 
rounds. 
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Fig. II.2 Consequences of cooperation in the public goods
game. a, Probability of receiving ‘no' in a round of the
indirect reciprocity game depending on whether a subject
had given either ‘yes' or ‘no' in the preceding round of the
public goods game in the alternating treatment. The
probability per group is shown (mean ± s.e.m) for both
situations; all individual situations were taken to generate
one mean value of either type for each group; paired t-test
with arcsine-transformed data, n = 10 groups, t = 3.7, P =
0.005. b, Payoff (DM) per group (mean ± s.e.m.) in the first
8 rounds of the public goods game of all groups that either
alternated the indirect reciprocity and the public goods
game during the first 16 rounds or started with 8
consecutive rounds of the public goods game and
thereafter played 8 rounds of indirect reciprocity; unpaired
t-test, d.f. = 17, t = 4.83, P<0.0002. 
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Obviously, refusing to give in the public goods game reduced the reputation of 
a player to a similar extent as if this person had refused to give in the indirect 
reciprocity game: his potential donor in the next round of indirect reciprocity just 
followed the rules for indirect reciprocity and refused to give to someone with a low 
image score. This is different from punishing because it does not need any special 
punishing rule or motivation, and the potential donor actually saves money by 
refusing to give. A recent theoretical analysis(Sigmund et al., 2001) suggests that 
reputation is essential for fostering social behaviour among selfish agents, which is 
confirmed experimentally here. The inclusion of reputation effects in the 
corresponding dynamical models leads to the evolution of economically productive 
behaviour, with agents contributing to the public good and either punishing those 
who do not or rewarding those who do (Sigmund et al., 2001). Providing help in the 
indirect reciprocity game is a form of reward. 
Cooperation in the public goods game paid off. Groups that alternated rounds 
of indirect reciprocity and public goods games, and thus were more cooperative in 
the public goods game, earned significantly more money during the first eight rounds 
of the public goods game than did groups that played the two games in blocks of 
eight rounds each (Fig. II.2b). This shows that the 'tragedy of the commons' was no 
longer a tragedy; instead, the commons became productive and could be harvested. 
Two people usually interact in more than one situation, therefore their actions in one 
context may influence actions in another (Coleman, 1990). Many social dilemmas 
are a type of public goods game (Ostrom et al., 1999), others have been identified as 
a type of indirect reciprocity game (Ledyard, 1995). It therefore seems likely that the 
kind of interaction that we have staged experimentally occurs naturally in our society. 
There might be hidden social dilemmas that would show up only if the interaction 
with another game were removed. 
 
Methods 
Indirect reciprocity game  
Players were anonymous; each subject was assigned a pseudoname by the 
computer for the whole session of 20 rounds so that at any time, players could make 
their decisions contingent on the history of the game up to that time; each player 
knew his/her name but did not know who had been assigned the other names; the 
subjects were separated by opaque partitions and communicated their decisions with 
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silent (piezo) switches; they knew that they would obtain their money after the game 
in a way that did not disclose their anonymity. 
For the 'indirect reciprocity game'20, each person was assigned repeatedly as either 
a potential donor or a potential receiver. For example, a potential donor, say 
'Telesto', was asked on the public screen whether he would give to 'Galatea'. Telesto 
would loose DM 2.50 from his account and Galatea would gain DM 4 on her account 
if Telesto decided 'yes'. Telesto's decision (yes or no) was displayed for 2 s on the 
public screen. Everybody knew about the contributions of all players, for example, 
whether Galatea had given in previous rounds when he/she had been playing as the 
potential donor. The subjects also knew that there would be no direct reciprocity; if A 
was the potential donor of B, B would never be the potential donor of A. In each 
round of the indirect reciprocity game, each of the six players was once a potential 
donor and once a potential receiver. 
 
Public goods game  
For the 'public goods game'4, all six players were asked simultaneously whether they 
would contribute DM 2.50 to the public pool, the contents of which would then be 
doubled and redistributed evenly among all players irrespective of whether they had 
contributed. After all players had decided, each player's decision (yes or no), his/her 
contribution (that is, DM 2.50 or 0), and his/her gain (for example, DM 4.17 if all but 
one had contributed), was displayed below the pseudonames for 20 s. 
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III  VOLUNTEERING LEADS TO ROCK-PAPER-SCISSORS DYNAMICS IN A 
PUBLIC GOODS GAME 
 
 
 
Collective efforts are a trademark of both insect and human societies (Trivers, 1985). 
They are achieved through relatedness in the former (Hamilton, 1964a) and through 
largely unknown mechanisms in the latter. The problem of achieving cooperation 
among non-kin has been described as the ‘tragedy of the commons’ prophesying the 
inescapable collapse of many human enterprises (Hardin, 1968; Hardin, 1998). In 
public goods experiments, initial cooperation usually drops quickly to almost zero 
(Ledyard, 1995). It can be maintained by either the opportunity to punish defectors 
(Fehr and Gächter, 2002) or the need to maintain good reputation (Milinski et al., 
2002b, chapter II). Both scenarios require defectors being identified. Recently, 
theorists proposed a simple but effective mechanism operating under full anonymity. 
With optional participation in the public goods game “loners”, i.e. those players who 
do not join the group, defectors and cooperators will coexist through a rock-paper-
scissors dynamics (Hauert et al., 2002a; Hauert et al., 2002b). Here we show 
experimentally that volunteering easily generates this dynamics in public goods 
games and that manipulating initial conditions can produce each predicted direction 
– if, by manipulating displayed decisions, defectors are pretended to have the 
highest frequency, loners soon become most frequent, as do cooperators after 
loners and defectors after cooperators, respectively. On average cooperation is 
perpetuated at a substantial level. 
 
 
Clean air to sustain the global climate and clean public toilets are examples of public 
resources which everybody is free to overuse. The social dilemma of public goods 
situations is that although a group of cooperators is always better off than a group of 
defectors, defectors exploit cooperators within groups. Since the late 1970’s 
economists, social scientists and evolutionary biologists have used the public goods 
game as a paradigm to study the problem of maintaining cooperation within a group 
of unrelated individuals (Berkes et al., 1989; Colman, 1995; Gintis, 2000a; Ostrom, 
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1999; Sugden, 1986): for example, six players are asked to contribute money to a 
public pool; the money in the pool is, e.g., multiplied by 3.6 and equally distributed 
among the players irrespective of whether they contributed. The optimum outcome 
for the group is achieved if everybody cooperates. However, since each euro paid 
into the pool yields only a return of 60 cents for the contributor, i.e. a net deficit of 
0.40 €, no matter how the other players decide, the selfish decision is never to 
contribute to the pool. Recent studies have identified punishment (Boyd and 
Richerson, 1992; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Gintis, 2000b), 
also combined with fairness (Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003), and reputation through 
interaction with other social behavior(Milinski et al., 2002b, chapter II) as 
mechanisms that can effectively maintain cooperation in public goods experiments.  
In their model Hauert et al. (Hauert et al., 2002a; Hauert et al., 2002b) 
consider a large population with three types of players: cooperators, defectors and 
loners. From time to time, sample groups of N players are randomly chosen and 
offered to participate in a single public goods game. Players can either refuse to 
participate, and then receive a small fixed payoff, or join the public goods game. In 
the latter case they either defect or cooperate. Their strategies are specified 
beforehand, and do not depend on the composition of the group. An ongoing 
oscillation of the three strategies is predicted because each strategy when most 
frequent can be beaten by one of the others. Defectors can exploit a large group of 
cooperators, whereas loners have the highest profit when defectors are frequent. 
When loners are most frequent the public group size is reduced, which invites 
cooperation because in small groups the game is no longer a dilemma (Boyd and 
Richerson, 1988; Dawes, 1980; Schelling, 1973). For example, if the group consists 
of only three players, each euro paid into the public pool yields a return of 1.20 € for 
the contributor, i.e. a net gain of 0.20 €. It is not just the fact that volunteering is 
possible that induces cooperation, but rather that volunteering reduces public goods 
groups to small sizes for which the individual cost to benefit ratio becomes more 
favourable. Furthermore, even though defectors are still better off than cooperators 
within each group, cooperators do better when averaged over small groups, 
according to Simpson’s paradox(Sober and Wilson, 1999): e.g., a group of three 
players can consist of either 3 cooperators, 2 cooperators and 1 defector, 1 
cooperator and 2 defectors, or 3 defectors. Cooperators receive on average a net 
gain of 1.8 €, defectors only 0.8 €. Circumstantial evidence for the “small group 
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advantage” is potentially provided by 
fish that leave their shoal and take the 
risk to inspect a predator from a short 
distance: minnows, Phoxinus 
phoxinus, inspect a pike, Esox lucius, 
very often in small groups.(Magurran 
and Pitcher, 1987) So after loners 
cooperators will be most frequent for 
a while before defectors will take over 
again (Hauert et al., 2002a; Hauert et 
al., 2002b). Hence, volunteering 
relaxes the social dilemma: instead of 
defectors winning the world, 
coexistence among cooperators, 
defectors and loners is expected 
(Michor and Nowak, 2002). 
We tested these predictions 
with 280 first semester biology 
students in twenty groups of 14 
students each that played the optional 
public goods game for 57 consecutive 
rounds. The students observed the 
introduction and the complete game 
on a public screen. They were told 
that they had a starting account of 10 
€ and would make their decisions 
anonymously. For each round six 
players were randomly selected from 
a “population” to decide first whether 
they join the public goods group and 
thereafter, if they chose to join, 
whether they like to contribute to the 
public pool. During the first seven 
rounds we manipulated the displayed 
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Fig. III.1   Decisions in round eight after the staged
standstill with one single strategy that was most
frequent during the first seven rounds, the bars of
the predicted strategy to be most frequent are black.
The average frequency of chosen strategies per
group of 14 players is shown (mean ± SE).  a, Start
loner;  n=6  groups of 14 players each with
simulated prevalence of loners during round 1 to 7.
b, Start cooperators;  n=8 groups of 14 players each
with simulated prevalence of cooperators during
round 1 to 7. c, Start defectors;  n=6 groups of 14
players each with simulated prevalence of defectors
during round 1 to 7.  
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decisions in such a way that defector, cooperator or loner was pretended to be the 
most frequent strategy of the population. This manipulation was necessary to test the 
three possible predictions of the model experimentally. Without this manipulation our 
results would be only descriptive. In the eighth round we expect that being loner 
(after staged defector), defector (after staged cooperator) or cooperator (after staged 
loner), respectively, would be the most frequent strategy according to the players’ 
real decisions. Thereafter the game proceeded with unmanipulated display to test 
whether oscillations of the three strategies occur and if so whether they occur 
predominantly in the predicted sequence during 50 rounds. 
Following the manipulated start during the first seven rounds we found that the 
predicted strategy was the most frequent strategy after all three starting scenarios in 
round eight (Fig. III.1 a-c) (P<0.004, n=20 groups, sign test, two-tailed). We use each 
group of 14 players as statistical unit. 
During the following 50 rounds we 
determined for each group of 14 
players the number of cases where 
two conditions were met: one 
strategy was most frequent and one 
of the other strategies was the most 
frequent strategy in the following 
round. We compared all cases where 
the predicted strategy became most 
frequent with all cases where an 
unpredicted strategy became most 
frequent. So we uncovered switches 
of the most frequent strategy 
between rounds and checked 
whether their direction was as 
predicted. The predicted strategy became most frequent significantly more often than 
the alternative strategy (Fig. III.2) (P<0.001, n=20, paired t-test, t=6.588, two-tailed).  
Although the above analysis provides a formal proof of the predicted 
oscillations we made an example of these oscillations visible in Fig. 3. We 
synchronized the 20 groups during the 50 not manipulated rounds by selecting 
similar starting points in each group, because the cycles were not expected to have 
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Fig. III.2   The predicted prevalence switch
occurred more frequently than the unpredicted
prevailence switch during the 50 rounds that
followed the seven manipulated start rounds.
Columns show mean ± SE per group of 14
players.  
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the same duration in each group. 
For example if we select that round 
from each group which has the 
highest proportion of loners, we 
would expect that cooperators 
would be most frequent next, 
followed by defectors in all 20 
groups. The same procedure was 
used to find such starting points for 
cooperators and for defectors. 
From several maxima of a strategy 
we defined the first as the starting 
point. Thereafter we averaged all 
20 starting point rounds and each 
of the following 9 rounds over all 
groups, for loners (Fig. III.3a), 
cooperators (Fig. III.3b) and 
defectors (Fig. III.3c), respectively, 
as starting points. The oscillations 
can be observed in all three cases, 
although the groups became 
increasingly asynchronous during 
the ten rounds. As the model 
predicts, after loners have the 
highest frequency cooperators 
follow to become most frequent, 
thereafter defectors and again 
loners (Fig. III.3a). After a 
prevalence of cooperators 
defectors become most frequent 
followed by loners and again 
cooperators (Fig. III.3b). Fig. III.3c 
shows that the prevalence of 
defectors is followed as predicted 
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Fig. III.3   Average frequencies of the three
strategies over a period of ten rounds after
synchronizing the 20 groups as follows. The starting
round of the ten rounds was defined for each group
as the round when one of the strategies reached its
maximum proportion throughout the game (rounds
8-57) for the first time. All 20 starting rounds and
each of the following 9 rounds were averaged over
all groups, for loners a, cooperators b and defectors
c, respectively. Sequence of predicted most
frequent strategies according to the rock-paper-
scissors dynamics: loners, cooperators, defectors,
loners, and so on.
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by an increase of loners that is closely trailed by increasing numbers of cooperators 
followed again by defectors and thereafter by loners. 
The consequences of the oscillation of the strategies should be an always 
recurring rise of each of the three strategies and thus a fairly cooperative outcome of 
the game after initial perturbations. In the last thirty rounds (21-50) the frequencies of 
the three strategies appeared on average rather stable (round 21-35: 32.22+1.0% 
loner, 30.11+0.9% cooperators, 37.67+1.0 % defectors and round 36-50: 
32.39+1.4% loner, 29.06+1.3% cooperators, 38.56+1.3% defectors). According to 
the model we expect at least 42% loners and 58% should choose to join the public 
goods group(Hauert et al., 2002a). Only 33+2.5% (mean+SE) chose the loner option, 
which is significantly less than expected (P=0.003, n=20, Wilcoxon signed rank test, 
Z=2.95, two-tailed). Of the players joining the public goods group 38% are expected 
to cooperate and 62% to defect, respectively(Hauert et al., 2002a).  We found, as 
expected, more defectors (56.51+1.7%) than cooperators (43.48+1.7%, P=0.004, 
n=20, Wilcoxon signed rank test, Z=2.91, two-tailed). Although these numbers are 
close to the expected ones, the percentage of cooperators was significantly higher 
than predicted (P=0.011, n=20, Wilcoxon signed rank test, Z=2.54, two-tailed).  
In the long run, i.e. averaging over many cycles, the net payoff of both 
defectors and cooperators should be same as the loners’ payoff, i.e. 1.25 €. We 
found that defectors earned slightly but significantly more than expected, i.e. 
1.46+0.04 € (P<0.001, n=20, Z=3.36, Wilcoxon signed rank test, two-tailed). 
Cooperators had a payoff that did not significantly differ from the expected one, i.e., 
1.32+0.09 € (P=0.43, n=20, Z=0.78, Wilcoxon signed rank test, two-tailed). Defectors 
probably profited because they were less frequent than expected at the equilibrium.  
We found that volunteering, i.e. the option to choose between joining the 
public goods group and the loner strategy, indeed protected cooperation in the public 
goods game by inducing small group sizes. There was on average a rather stable 
frequency of cooperators that was higher than what is usually found in public goods 
games after several rounds (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Ledyard, 1995). As predicted 
by the model (Hauert et al., 2002a; Hauert et al., 2002b) the dynamics of the games 
displayed oscillations of the rock-paper-scissors succession of cooperators, 
defectors, and loners even though our players were a bit less risk averse than 
expected: only about a third chose the loner option.  
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Volunteering is a mechanism, which potentially sustains cooperation in 
various species. Like some large predatory animals, also ancestral humans acted as 
groups when hunting large prey, e.g. mammoths, and went out solitarily for small 
prey, e.g. antelopes (Ridley, 1996). Thus, volunteering was possible and might have 
supported cooperation in addition to potential relatedness by reducing the public 
(hunting) group size. Obviously, we are not free to decide whether we stop sharing 
the global climate with others, but there are many other human social dilemmas in 
which volunteering is possible. Volunteering does not produce overwhelming 
cooperation but might help avoiding the fate of mutual defection in many human 
collective enterprises and thus pave the way for other mechanisms of cooperation to 
take over. For example, direct (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981) or indirect reciprocity 
(Bolton et al., 2001; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998b; Seinen and Schram, 2001; 
Wedekind and Milinski, 2000) may be catalysed when the population happens to be 
in a cooperator period of the rock-paper-scissors dynamic and anonymity is relaxed 
after repeated interactions. Loners, although unsocial by definition, help cooperators 
to become most frequent and thus to escape the social dilemma. 
 
Methods 
The total of 280 human subjects of the universities of Bonn, Hamburg and Kiel 
played a public goods game with optional participation that lasted for 57 rounds. The 
students were completely anonymous, sat between partitions, saw the introduction to 
the game including one example round and the complete game on a large screen. 
They did not know the total number of rounds. They interacted via a computer 
program using silent “yes” and “no” switches.  
For each round the computer program randomly selected six of the 14 
students. Each student had played almost the same number of rounds at the end of 
the game. Since the expected cycles are predicted to become smoother with 
increasing population size (Hauert et al., 2002a), we mimicked a larger population. 
The students were told that there was a pool of additional players in the form of 
strategies recorded from earlier sessions and that the program would sometimes 
choose “players” from this pool.  A light at each person’s desk signalled who was to 
decide. Each of the six players had to decide first whether to play the loner strategy 
thereby obtaining a fixed payoff (1.25 €) or to join the public goods group with a 
second decision to make. The minimum public group size was two players. If only 
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one player decided to play in the public goods group she knew that she would 
automatically become also a loner. If the public goods group size was either two or 
larger, the players that had chosen to play in the public goods group had to decide 
whether they would contribute 1.25 € or nothing to the public pool. At this time they 
did not yet know how many subjects had decided to play in the public goods group. 
After all players of the public goods group made their final decision the content of the 
pool was multiplied by 3.6 and divided evenly among the players that had joined the 
public goods group irrespective of their actual contribution. With an interest rate of 
3.6 the model system has a fixed point, which refers to substantial proportions of 
cooperators, defectors and loners. The dynamic then predicts periodic cycles of all 
three strategies around these levels, this requires an interest rate larger than 2. Only 
now the decisions of all players were displayed simultaneously on the screen that all 
14 subjects could see: i.e., the numbers of loners and public good group players, 
their payoffs and their eventual costs, (e.g., one player was a loner and obtained 
1.25 € without cost, five had chosen to join the public goods group, of which three 
were defectors who received a payoff of 1.80 € from the pool without costs and two 
were cooperators who also received 1.80 € from the pool, but they had costs of 1.25 
€ each). It never happened that one subject had to play loner because he had no 
money left. 
During the first seven rounds the display was manipulated such that the 
players were lead to believe that they were in a group that played a high percentage 
of only one strategy. In six groups loners appeared to be most frequent; there were 
eight groups with cooperators and six with defectors as the apparent most frequent 
strategy. The players could make decisions, which were, however, not displayed. 
Instead, six predetermined decisions with corresponding payoffs and eventual costs 
were shown. Each of the three possible real decisions of a player (i.e. loner, 
cooperator and defector) was included at least once to ensure that each player 
would find his actual decision on the screen and nobody would doubt that the 
displayed decisions were real. The maximum number of defectors or cooperators 
displayed on the screen was 4 players per round; e.g. 4 defectors, 1 cooperator, 1 
loner. In the case of loners prevailing the first seven rounds, it was possible to show 
up to 100% loners in one round, because each player who decided to join the public 
goods group would believe that he/she was the only one with this decision and thus 
became a loner. In order to have some variation we chose the average percentage 
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of loners somewhat lower during the seven rounds. On average there were 79% 
loners in the staged loner groups, 61% cooperators in the staged cooperator groups 
and 64% defectors in the staged defector groups. Starting with round eight there was 
no manipulation of the display for 50 consecutive rounds. The students did not know 
the total number of rounds to be played. 
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IV  A HUMAN COOPERATION STRATEGY THAT IS CONDITIONAL ON BEING 
RECOGNIZED IN OTHER SITUATIONS 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Although collective efforts are common in both animal and human societies, many 
human and probably animal social dilemmas have no obvious cooperative solution, 
which is a challenge for evolutionary biologists. In public goods games, i.e. the 
experimental paradigm for studying the sustainability of a public resource with 
human subjects, initial cooperation usually declines quickly. Recently it has been 
shown that the interaction with another social game in which good reputation attracts 
help, can maintain a high level of cooperation in the public goods game. Here we 
show experimentally that humans use different strategies in the public goods game 
conditional on whether the player knows that his decisions will be either known or 
unknown in another social game. The knowledge of being recognized as the same 
individual in both scenarios motivates players to invest in their reputation and thus in 
sustaining the public resource. However, cooperation declines immediately when 
individual identities switch from being recognizable to being unrecognizable between 
the two interacting games.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
Cooperative behavior such as hunting in groups is known from several species, e.g. 
chimpanzees, lions, archaic and modern humans. Many aspects of present human 
societies depend on cooperation in order to function properly. The evolution of 
cooperative behavior within populations of selfish individuals is usually explained 
through either kin selection (Hamilton, 1964b), mutualism or reciprocal 
altruism(Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Trivers, 1971). Recently theorists (Leimar and 
Hammerstein, 2001; Lotem et al., 1999; Mohtashemi and Mui, 2003; Nowak and 
Sigmund, 1998a; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998b) have shown that cooperation can 
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evolve also through indirect reciprocity (Alexander, 1987), “give and you shall 
receive”. By helping others, who do not have the possibility to return the help to the 
donor in the future, people build up good reputation or a positive image score, 
whereas refusing to help damages the reputation. Empirical studies confirmed that 
human subjects who have been helpful in the past are more likely to receive help 
from others through indirect reciprocity (Bolton et al., 2001; Milinski et al., 2001; 
Milinski et al., 2002a, chapter I; Seinen and Schram, 2001; Wedekind and Milinski, 
2000).   
This is, however, different in “public goods situations” which are typical social 
dilemmas where cooperation declines (Fischbacher et al., 2001). Social scientists, 
economists and evolutionary theorists have studied public goods situations 
extensively (Berkes et al., 1989; Dawes, 1980; Hardin, 1998; Ledyard, 1995; Ostrom, 
1999) since Hardin first described this type of social dilemma as the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ (Hardin, 1968). The classic public goods game consists of four players, 
who are given the opportunity to contribute money into a public pool. The content of 
the pool is doubled, divided by the number of players and evenly paid to all players, 
irrespective of their contributions. The social dilemma lies in the conflict between the 
group and the individual’s interest. The group does best when all players cooperate. 
However, a rational individual should never contribute anything, because each 
money unit paid into the pool yields only a return of a half-unit to the contributor. 
Thus, a limited public resource, which everyone is free to use, e.g. the global climate, 
unmanaged fish stock in common fishing grounds, or hygiene in highly anonymous 
public places such as train stations, is usually not sustained. There are certainly 
numerous potential scenarios where microorganisms (Rainey and Rainey, 2003; 
Velicer and Yu, 2003) or animals are found in public goods situations, e.g., when 
several individual parasites grow in an intermediate host, this “public resource” would 
not be sustained if each parasite would take as much energy from its host as if it 
would be alone (Christen and Milinski, 2003; Parker et al., 2003). Nonetheless there 
are several examples from human societies where the social dilemma has been 
successfully avoided by mechanisms such as control of access to the public good by 
the local community (Berkes et al., 1989). 
Recently it has been shown that potential punishment of uncooperative group 
members (Boyd and Richerson, 1992; Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Gintis, 2000b; 
Sigmund et al., 2001), costly signaling with altruistic acts (Gintis et al., 2001), 
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voluntary participation in the public goods game (Hauert et al., 2002b; Semmann et 
al., 2003, chapter III) and the interaction with indirect reciprocity situations can help 
solving the “tragedy of the commons” (Milinski et al., 2002b, chapter II).  In the latter 
study groups of human volunteers played public goods games alternated with 
indirect reciprocity games. This alternation produced a high level of cooperation in 
the public goods games. Cooperation was maintained throughout the experiment, 
except when groups were informed that the last rounds would consist only of public 
goods games. The decline of cooperation in these groups suggests that the 
decisions made in the public goods games were relevant for the player’s reputation 
in the indirect reciprocity games. An alternative explanation for the observed break 
down of cooperation is the following: the interaction between the two games leading 
to potential information overload because of the limited channel capacity of the brain 
(Broadbent, 1965; Milinski, 1990) could have resulted in cooperative decisions. 
Removing the interaction between the two games would have removed this overload 
thereby allowing for uncooperative decisions again.  
In the present experiment we did not remove the interaction between the two 
games. Instead we allowed for reputation transfer from the public goods game to the 
indirect reciprocity game in one treatment but did not allow for this transfer in the 
other treatment. If we find a higher level of cooperation in the public goods game 
when we allow for reputation transfer, this potential for reputation transfer must have 
caused the rise of investment in the public good. We achieved the manipulation of 
the reputation transfer by providing the subjects each with two different new 
identities, i.e. two pseudonyms. Each participant received two names of moons of 
our solar system, e.g. Telesto, Kalisto, ect.. One name was used only in public goods 
rounds whereas the other name was used in rounds of both games. With this 
procedure we test whether human subjects make strategic use of their knowledge of 
being recognized or not recognized as the same individual in both scenarios. We test 
whether this knowledge motivates players to invest in their reputation and thus in 
sustaining the public resource.   
Humans may meet their neighbors repeatedly in various social games and should 
expect that their reputation would be transferred among games. However, when 
visiting other neighborhoods or other villages it may be rewarding to be 
uncooperative in a public goods game unless gossip finds the way home.  
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2. Method 
We conducted our experiment with 120 students of the Universities of Bonn, 
Hamburg and Kiel. Each group consisted of 6 students, who were anonymous with 
respect to their real identity but were provided with two new identities, i.e. 
pseudonyms, under which they were recognized throughout the game. Thus, during 
the game the players learned about the decisions of other players only under these 
pseudonyms. Separated from each other, all players could observe the complete 
history of the game on a large screen and communicate their decisions through silent 
“yes” and “no” buttons at their desks.  An oral introduction informed about the 
assignment of pseudonyms, the use of the silent switches and the procedure of the 
introductory part of the computer program (Milinski et al., 2001), which explained by 
means of both text and example rounds the rules of the game and provided each 
student with a starting account of 10 € and two different pseudonyms. The 
participants were informed that nobody including the experimenters could find out 
which pseudonym belonged to which real name. To assure the participants of this 
fact they were asked to choose a cable from a knotted bunch of identical cables. The 
chosen cable was then connected to the decision box at the participant’s desk. After 
the last round the cables were disconnected and intermixed in front of the 
participants. This procedure was necessary to perform the experiment double blind, 
to avoid a rise in cooperation simply due to the fact that the participants did not fully 
believe in their anonymity (Hoffman et al., 1996).  
The students played a mixture of public goods (PG) rounds during which all 6 
players made their choices simultaneously and indirect reciprocity (IR) rounds with 
pair wise interactions. In each of the PG rounds the players could contribute 1.25 € 
from their account into the public pool. The content of the pool was then doubled and 
evenly distributed among all players irrespective of whether they had contributed. All 
the decisions, costs of the decisions and the money paid to the players from the 
public pool were simultaneously displayed after the last player had made her 
decision. Every IR round consisted of two interactions for each of the 6 players, once 
as the potential donor and once as the potential receiver. The subjects knew that the 
same two players could meet again in the same roles but never in alternated roles, 
so direct reciprocity was excluded. If a potential donor decided to donate, 1.25 € 
were taken from the player’s account and 2.00 € were credited to the receiver’s 
account. Since the value of the help received should be higher than the value of the 
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costs for the donor (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998a), 0.75 € was added to the amount 
given.  Before a potential donor would make her decision, some information about 
the potential receivers behavior as a donor in earlier rounds was displayed. 
The first pseudonym (“reputation name”) was used in all IR rounds. During each IR 
round the past decisions of the potential receiver of all the rounds where the 
reputation name had been used were displayed. Therefore all decisions made in IR 
rounds were shown in the future IR rounds. The reputation name was also used in 
some of the PG rounds, so the participants new that a decision made with the 
reputation name in a PG round would also be displayed in all future IR rounds. In the 
remaining PG rounds the second pseudonym (“reputation-free name”) was used. 
The players were informed that the decisions of these rounds would never be 
displayed in any future rounds.  
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Fig. IV.1 For the public goods rounds (circle symbols) and indirect reciprocity rounds (square
symbols) the group mean yes per round for both treatments are shown. In treatment one (blue) the
groups played PG rounds, from round 11 to round 20 with their reputation name (R) (filled symbols)
and from round 21 to 25 with their reputation-free name (RF). In treatment two (red) the groups
played PG rounds, from round 11 to round 20 with their reputation-free name and from round 21 to
25 with their reputation name. The period from round 1 to 10 was in both treatments identical (three
PG rounds played with the reputation-free name, two IR rounds with the reputation name, three
public goods rounds with the reputation name and two IR rounds with the reputation name).  
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Each group started with 3 PG rounds using the reputation-free name, followed by 2 
IR rounds, where the decisions of the first 3 rounds were not displayed (see fig. 
IV.1). Rounds 6 to 8 were PG rounds with the reputation name. Rounds 9 and 10 
were IR rounds, where all previous decisions made with the reputation name were 
displayed. This introductory part was the same for both treatments to help the 
students to become accustomed to the procedure. The last 15 rounds (11 to 25) 
were the actual test in which the 2 treatments differed in order to control for 
sequence effects. 10 groups played 10 PG rounds with the players’ reputation 
names, followed by 5 PG rounds with the reputation-free names (treatment 1). The 
other 10 groups played 10 PG rounds with the reputation-free names, followed by 5 
rounds with the reputation names (treatment 2). The students were not informed 
about the number of rounds to be played, the sequence of IR and PG rounds or the 
sequence of pseudonyms to be used.   
 
3. Results 
In the groups of treatment 1 (PG rounds 11 to 20 with the reputation name and PG 
rounds 21 to 25 with the reputation-free name) the level of cooperation was 
significantly higher during the rounds with the reputation name (average cooperation 
per round 63.0%) than during the rounds with the reputation-free name (average 
cooperation per round 43.7%), (Wilcoxon signed ranks matched pairs test, z=1,99, 
p=0.047, n=10 groups, two tailed; we use each group of 6 students as the statistical 
unit to avoid pseudoreplication) (fig. IV.1). In the groups of treatment 2 (PG rounds 
11 to 20 with the reputation-free name and PG rounds 21 to 25 with the reputation 
name) the level of cooperation was also significantly higher in rounds with the 
reputation name (average cooperation per round 66.0%), than in rounds with the 
reputation-free name (average cooperation per round 48.2%, Wilcoxon signed ranks 
matched pairs test, z=2.60, p=0.009, n=10 groups, two tailed). Combining the 
probabilities from treatment 1 and 2 depicts a highly significant overall effect (Fischer 
combination test, chi-square=15.538, p<0.005, df=4). 
The players of treatment 1 earned significantly more money (average 1.74 € per 
round) with the reputation name in PG rounds than with the reputation-free name 
(average 1.06 €) (Wilcoxon signed ranks matched pairs test, z=2.80, p=0.005, n=10, 
two tailed). This was also the case in treatment 2 (average 1.65 € per round with 
reputation name, 1.20 € per round with reputation-free name, Wilcoxon signed ranks 
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matched pairs test, z=2.60, p=0.009, n=10, two tailed). The combined effect is highly 
significant (Fisher combination test, chi-square=20.018, p<0.001, df=4).  
 
4. Discussion 
This study shows that the knowledge of being recognized with the same identity 
(name) in both a public goods (PG) game and an indirect reciprocity (IR) game 
produces a high level of cooperation in the public goods game. When the subjects 
had different identities in the two games, cooperation in the public goods game 
declined as usual. This result implies that humans are well aware of whether they will 
be recognized in a future social situation, and use this information to invest in their 
reputation only if it will probably pay off in the other context. This can be called 
strategic investment in reputation. Similarly, when human subjects were allowed to 
punish uncooperative players (by imposing a fine) in a public goods game, the level 
of cooperation increased immediately (Fehr and Gächter, 2002) showing that they 
were well aware of whether uncooperative behavior could be punished. 
We cannot exclude that the interaction of playing the two games has an effect on the 
level of cooperation in addition to subjects having always the same identity; such an 
additional interaction effect is suggested by the relatively high level of cooperation in 
PG rounds with the reputation-free name. 
Our results also imply that being recognized can remove the social dilemma from a 
public goods scenario. If everybody is under pressure to invest in her reputation, 
there is no longer a conflict between the group’s and the individual’s interest. The 
public resource was almost maximized and we found that everybody gained a high 
personal payoff in this scenario. The payoff per player was significantly higher when 
the subjects knew they would be recognized in the other game than when they 
expected to be unrecognizable there. Reputation may be a currency that can be 
used in various social contexts (Sigmund et al., 2001). In a previous study (Milinski et 
al., 2002a, chapter I) we found that donations made to charity (UNICEF) significantly 
increased the probability of being helped in an indirect reciprocity game if the 
donations were made public. This shows that people can actively invest in their 
reputation even when no public goods situation is available. 
However, even full anonymity does not necessarily cause the breakdown of 
cooperation in a public goods situation if certain conditions are met. Recently, Hauert 
et al. (2002b) proposed that with optional participation in the public goods game 
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“loners”, i.e. those players who do not join a public goods group, cooperators who 
join the group and contribute into the public good and defectors who join the group 
but do not contribute into the public good will coexist through a rock-paper-scissors 
dynamics even under full anonymity. An experimental study (Semmann et al., 2003, 
chapter III) showed that the opportunity for this kind of „volunteering“ easily 
generates this dynamics in public goods games with human subjects. The rock paper 
scissors dynamics comes up, because if the majority of the group chooses to be 
cooperators the highest payoff is achieved as a defector, resulting in an increasing 
number of players choosing this strategy. When defectors dominate, the highest 
payoff can be achieved through choosing to be a loner. Finally when loners dominate 
the public good group size is very small and the highest payoff is achieved by 
choosing to cooperate in such small groups. However when cooperators increase in 
numbers the public goods group size increases again and the cycle continues. 
Through the recurring rise of loners, cooperators, defectors and the connected public 
goods group size changes cooperation is perpetuated at a substantial level on 
average. However, the results of the present study suggest that if anonymity would 
be removed the decisions made in any public goods situation could be recalled in 
other social games and would thereby be connected to reputation building, the rock-
paper-scissors dynamics is reduced and may eventually disappear. As a result 
cooperation would be perpetuated at an even higher level even in larger public 
goods groups. This prediction awaits experimental testing. 
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V  REPUTATION IS VALUABLE INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE OWN SOCIAL 
GROUP 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Humans cooperate successfully in groups of unrelated individuals and by doing so 
pose one of the major problems for the behavioral sciences. The quest for finding the 
underlying mechanisms has centered on social dilemmas, such as the public goods 
game, where humans often fail to sustain a public resource. The need to maintain a 
good reputation for other social interactions has been identified as an effective 
mechanism to lead to cooperative behavior in public goods situations. Here we 
show, that building a good reputation in a public goods situation is not only valuable 
while interacting in other social situations within the own social group. The reputation 
is also highly valuable when interacting with members of a different social group. 
Humans reward an individual’s good reputation without ever having experienced the 
individuals’ positive behavior themselves. In this experiment humans sustain public 
resources in order to profit from their good reputation in future encounters with others 
in and outside the own social group. 
 
Introduction 
Modern human societies strongly depend on cooperative behavior, which in many 
respects is still an unsolved puzzle. The question why unrelated individuals 
cooperate has entangled scientist since the proposal of reciprocal altruism as one of 
the underlying mechanisms that promote cooperative behavior (Trivers, 1971). 
Especially the problem why humans are not able to sustain a public resource, which 
everybody in a group of genetically unrelated individuals is free to overuse, has been 
a major focus in the past. Hardin first described this situation as the “tragedy of the 
commons” (Hardin, 1968) and it has been studied intensively ever since as the public 
goods game (Berkes et al., 1989; Dawes, 1980; Hardin, 1998; Ledyard, 1995; 
Ostrom, 1999; Ostrom et al., 1999). Recently empirical and theoretical studies have 
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identified reputation building (Milinski et al., 2002b, chapter II), punishment (Boyd 
and Richerson, 1992; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Gintis, 2000b), even altruistic 
punishment (Fehr and Gächter, 2002) and volunteering (Hauert et al., 2002b; 
Semmann et al., 2003, chapter III) as mechanisms that promote cooperation in this 
type of social dilemma. The standard public goods game (Ledyard, 1995) consists of 
four players who have the possibility to contribute a money unit into a public pool 
anonymously. The content of the pool is then doubled and paid evenly to all players 
irrespectively of their contributions into the public pool. This situation poses a conflict 
between the group interest and the individuals interest. The group stands best if all 
players contribute into the public pool. However, the rational individual should never 
invest into the public pool, because a money unit invested is doubled and then 
divided by four players. Therefore only half of the money unit is returned to original 
investor. In addition defectors do always better than cooperators within the same 
group. Nevertheless experiments with humans usually begin with a high cooperative 
level that declines over time (Fischbacher et al., 2001). In order to avoid the decline 
of cooperation one can make the decisions in the public goods situation reputation 
relevant by making these decisions known in an indirect reciprocity context (Milinski 
et al., 2002b, chapter II). In indirect reciprocity situations a good reputation 
(Alexander, 1987; Zahavi, 1991) or positive image score (Nowak and Sigmund, 
1998a; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998b) can be achieved by acts of help and 
experimental studies have shown that a good image score is rewarded by others 
(Milinski et al., 2001; Seinen and Schram, 2001; Wedekind and Milinski, 2000). A 
recent study confirmed that a good reputation gained in public goods situations is 
also highly valuable in indirect reciprocity games (Semmann et. al. submitted, 
chapter IV).  
Here we present that building a good reputation in public goods games is potentially 
valuable outside the own social group where the reputation was built. A good 
reputation is possibly just like a currency transferable to a different social group, 
where it valued just as high as within the own social group. Humans regularly interact 
with numerous people in different contexts. With some people one only interacts in 
one social context or group whereas with others one interacts in more than one 
social context or group. Nevertheless it is not unlikely that information about the 
interactions in other social groups is accessible. For example picture a person A has 
two neighbors B and C and all three work for the same corporation. However, 
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neighbor B is in the same department and neighbor C is not. So our person A is 
interacting with neighbor C exclusively on a private basis and with neighbor B 
professionally and privately. Nevertheless person A is able to hear about neighbor 
Cs behavior at the company or might even observe the interactions himself without 
ever being involved. Therefore person A has the possibility to take the behavior of 
neighbor C at the company into account when deciding whether or not to help in a 
private context.   
 
Method 
We conducted the experiment with 228 Students of the Universities of Hamburg, 
Bonn and Kiel. Always 12 Students formed a group, which played a computerized 
game. The participants made their decisions throughout the game anonymously in 
regard to their real life identity. Several measures were necessary to preserve the 
players anonymity while the game was in progress. All participants were separated 
by partitions and could make their decisions through silent yes and no buttons at 
their desk. A short oral introduction included an explanation of how the individuals’ 
anonymity was assured and the use of the buttons. This was followed with choosing 
a connecting cable from a bunch of similar looking cables, which were disconnected 
after the game to furthermore assure the participants of the anonymity of their 
decisions. The necessity to carry out the experiment double blind has been 
previously pointed out by Hoffman et.al. (1996) as a way to prevent an artificial rise 
of cooperation. This procedure was followed by a detailed text introduction by the 
computer ending with the program assigning each player a pseudonym. The 
pseudonyms were names 
of moons of our solar 
system (e.g. Telesto, 
Nereid) in order to have 
memorable names without 
possible prefixed 
reputations. The players 
could observe the complete game over a large screen on the wall. Every decision 
made by a player throughout the game was shown together with the players’ 
pseudonym. Therefore the decisions of the players were not anonymous, but 
associated with their pseudonym. 
A B C D E F 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 2 3 D E F A B C 4 5 6  IR groups 
PG groups
Fig. V.1: Group composition in PG and IR rounds.  
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 In each public goods (PG) round the 12 participants were divided in two PG 
groups of six players (e.g. in the first PG group were the players 1 to 6 and in the 
second PG group were the players A to F; Fig. V.1). The composition of the two PG 
groups was maintained throughout the experiment. Each PG round consisted of the 
program announcing that it was now the first six players (1-6) turn to play. The 
pseudonyms of these players were shown and they were asked if they wanted to 
contribute 1.25 € into their public pool. When all players had made their decision the 
results were displayed on the screen for 25 seconds. The same procedure was then 
carried out with the second six players (A-F). The composition of the PG groups was 
always the same in all PG rounds. 
For all indirect reciprocity (IR) rounds three players were exchanged between 
the PG groups (e.g. in the first IR group were the players: 1, 2, 3, D, E, F and in the 
second IR group were the players: 4, 5, 6, A, B, C; Fig. V.1). The composition of the 
two IR groups was also maintained for all IR rounds throughout the experiment. 
Therefore each player (e.g. player 1 in Fig. V.1) had two players he was interacting 
with in both situations (players 2 and 3), three players he would exclusively meet in 
PG rounds (players 4, 5 and 6) and three players he would only interact with in IR 
rounds (players D, E and F). An indirect reciprocity round started with the 
announcement that the first group of six players would now play the IR round. 
Throughout the round each player was once in the role of the potential donor and 
once in the role of the potential receiver. As a donor the player was asked if she 
wanted to give 1.25 € from her account to the receiver. If the player decided YES the 
money was taken from her account and 2.00 € were credited to the account of the 
receiver. The amount credited to the receivers account was higher, because in 
theory, the donors costs of giving help is lower than the value of the help to the 
receiver (see (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998a; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998b). Before a 
player made her decision all decisions of the receiver in the past rounds were 
displayed. Finally the donors’ decision was displayed for three seconds. The players 
knew from the introduction that two players who have met once with certain roles 
(e.g. player A as donor and player B as receiver) would never meet again throughout 
the game in alternated roles (e.g. player B as donor and player A as receiver). They 
knew it was possible that they would meet with the same roles again. After the first 
six players had been all once donor and once receiver it was announced that the 
second group of six players would now play the IR round. 
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The experiment lasted 16 rounds. The first round was an IR round followed by 
alternating PG rounds and IR rounds until round 12. The last four rounds were 
exclusively PG rounds. At the end of round 12 the players were informed that only 
PG rounds would follow until the end of the game. The participants had no 
knowledge of the number of rounds to be played at any time throughout the 
experiment. After the experiment the participants were asked to answer the following 
question on a questionnaire: “Where you aware while playing with someone in a pair 
round if you had also played with this person in the group round?” (The terms used in 
the introduction and the questionnaire were pair round instead of IR round and group 
rounds instead of PG round). If they answered this question with yes they could also 
clarify this by marking always, often, seldom or never. The participants were 
furthermore asked to clarify their decision and were free to make additional 
comments.   
 
Results 
The average cooperation was fairly stable on a very high level until round 12, 
where the players were informed that only public goods rounds would follow (Fig. 2).  
The initial 
cooperation in 
round 1 was 
very high 
(79.39 %) and 
dropped 
significantly 
from to round 
3 (69.73 
%)(compared 
average 
cooperation 
round 1 and 
round 3, 
Wilcoxon signed rank test, n = 19, p = 0.013, Z = -2.50, two tailed; Fig. 2; to avoid 
pseudoreplication we used each group (19 groups) of twelve subjects as our 
statistical unit in the first part of our analysis). Thereafter the cooperation is fairly 
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Fig. V.2 Average Cooperation per round per group. Black square symbols
represent IR rounds and white round symbols represent PG rounds. 
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stable and the decline was not significant any more (compared average cooperation 
in round 3 and round 11, Wilcoxon signed rank test, n = 19, p = 0.33, Z = -9.74, two 
tailed). After the announcement that only PG rounds would follow until the end of the 
game in round 12 the cooperation declined highly significantly (compared average 
cooperation in round 12 and round 16, Wilcoxon signed rank test, n = 19, p = 0.001, 
Z = -3.31, two tailed).  As in previous experiments the cooperation until round 12 was 
higher in PG rounds than in indirect reciprocity rounds (compared average 
cooperation of six PG rounds and six IR rounds 12 and round 16, Wilcoxon signed 
rank test, n = 19, p = 0.008, Z = -2.66, two tailed). 
Players who had refused to give in a PG round where more likely to receive 
NO in the following IR round than players who had given in a PG round (paired t-test, 
n = 19, p <= 0.0001, T = -5.93, two tailed). If the players were playing in the same 
PG group the 
probability to receive 
NO in the next IR 
round after refusing 
to give in the PG 
round was still 
significantly higher 
than after giving in 
the PG round (paired 
t-test, n = 19, p = 
0.002, T = -3.532, 
two tailed; Fig. 3). 
However, to have 
played together with 
the donor in the same 
PG group did not 
further increase the likelihood to receive NO compared to having a donor who played 
in the other PG group (paired t-test, n = 19, p = 0.743, T = -0.333, two tailed; Fig. 3). 
If the players were in different PG groups the probability to receive NO in the next IR 
round after refusing to give in the PG round was yet again significantly higher than 
after giving in the PG round (paired t-test, n = 19, p = 0.01, T = -2.900, two tailed; 
Fig. 3). And once more not to have played together with the donor in the same PG 
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Fig. V.3 Probability to receive YES in a round depending on
whether the recipient had either given or not given in the previous
PG round and on whether the recipient and the donor had played
together or not together in the same PG group. The probability per
group (mean ± s.e.m.) for all four situations is shown. 
_______________________________________________ 75 
group did not increase the likelihood to receive NO compared to having a donor who 
played in the same PG group (paired t-test, n = 19, p = 0.542, T = -0.622, two tailed; 
Fig. 3). 
In order to confirm the negative finding we tested whether it really had no 
influence on the decision to having played with someone in the same public goods 
group or not. Since there was no difference on the group level to confirm this, the 
conservative approach was to consider each decision of every player as the 
statistical unit in order to use all available information to find a difference in the 
behavior. The analysis was done with a binary logistic regression model in order to 
use the complete available information even though we increased thereby 
pseudoreplication to some extend in comparison to using the group as the statistical 
unit. Nevertheless there was again no difference between having played together in 
public goods rounds or not and the probability to receive YES in an IR round (binary 
logistic regression, n = 
1140, p=0.820, β= 
0.588, s.e.=0.062).  
Consequently 
going one step further 
we incorporated the 
results of the 
questionnaires into the 
analysis. The 
questionnaires showed 
that of 228 Students 
103 (45.18%) 
answered that they 
were not aware 
throughout the game 
whether they had 
played with the current 
pair rounds (IR rounds) 
partner also in the 
group rounds (PG 
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Fig. V.4 Probability to receive YES in a round depending on whether
the recipient had either given or not given in the previous PG round
and on whether the recipient and the donor had played together or
not together in the same PG group. The probability per group (mean
± s.e.m.) for all four situations is shown. Only the decisions are
included of participants who had answered in the questionnaire that
they were conscious about the fact whether or not they had played
together with the current receiver in the PG round and in addition
had also said they had used this information for their decision finding
always or often.
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round). The other 115 Students (54.82%) answered that they indeed where aware of 
this fact. Of these 115 Students, 3 specified that they had always used this 
information, 35 used this information frequently, 58 used this information seldom and 
18 did not use this information. The remaining 11 students did not specify their 
positive answer further. We again analyzed the data, but this time we included only 
the decisions of those players who had answered the questionnaires with YES in 
combination with either always or often. If there was any difference between the 
treatment of players of the own PG group and the other PG group then this should 
show here. However there was still no difference (binary logistic regression, n=170, 
p=0.911, s.e.=0.156, β=0.357). Nonetheless the difference of the probability to 
receive YES in an IR round whether a player had given or not given in the previous 
PG round remained significant (binary logistic regression, n=170, p=0.017, 
s.e.=0.156, β=0.357) 
 
Discussion 
There is good empirical evidence that building a good reputation is highly 
valuable for interacting with members of the own social group. A good reputation 
increases the chance of receiving help from others (Milinski et al., 2002b, chapter II; 
Seinen and Schram, 2001; Wedekind and Milinski, 2000) and additionally even 
increases the likelihood to be elected in a political context (Milinski et al., 2002a, 
chapter I). Furthermore it has been shown that humans strategically invest to 
preserve their good reputation (Semmann et. al. submitted, chapter IV). 
Members of the own social group often times profit directly or indirectly from 
building a good reputation and reward such behavior with cooperation. This study 
shows that even outsiders who have never profited of the process of reputation 
building reward a good reputation gained outside their social group. There are two 
facts that indicate that the players do not treat group members and outsiders 
differently. First we found that the average cooperation was higher in public goods 
rounds than in the indirect reciprocity rounds, resembling the results of our previous 
study with only one social group (Milinski et al., 2002b, chapter II). Secondly the 
majority of participants answered in the questionnaire that they either paid no 
attention to the available information or simply did not use it. Directly testing for 
whether players behave differently towards group members and outsiders, we found 
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no difference on the group level or the single decision level, even for those players 
who had explicitly answered in the questionnaire that they used this information, 
treated both types of players equally.  
In order for this mechanism to work the information about the individuals’ 
reputation has to be accessible over the boarders of the social group. This can be 
achieved through observation of interactions and possibly through gossip or written 
records. Reputation can be understood as a valuable currency, which can be 
accumulated in social interactions. A good reputation is gained by playing by the 
rules of the social community. Similar to other currencies our data shows that it is 
transferable between social groups. This transferability might be limited to similar 
cultures, because a good reputation, which was built under different rules for socially 
accepted behavior, might not transfer as easily. Even though that person has played 
by the rules of one cultural context it might not resemble acceptable behavior in a 
different culture. For instance the table etiquette is quite different between cultures, it 
is not acceptable to eat with your fingers in western cultures whereas it is perfectly 
acceptable in other cultures.  
Reputation building seems to have a major impact on the stability of 
cooperative behavior in humans. Transferability to other social groups may be one of 
the essential mechanisms necessary to sustain cooperation in very large social 
groups in which individuals interact often with some members and very seldom with 
others.  
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Conclusion 
 
When I started working on human cooperative behavior it seemed obvious to me 
why humans cooperate. My view of cooperation was that everybody profits when 
people work together for a common goal. This simple view was most likely the result 
of growing up in a society, which is strongly influenced by cooperation between 
unrelated individuals. Thereby I had learned the rules how and when to cooperate 
with other by heart. However, the ever present, oftentimes subtle conflict between 
the individuals’ interest and the group interest discussed in the previous five chapters 
reveals that there is much more involved in cooperative behavior. This work altered 
my original view of cooperation and sharpened my eye for conflict situations.  
Each chapter shows us a piece of the puzzle of why and under which 
circumstances cooperative behavior can be established and sustained. Introducing 
reputation can change the outcome of usually uncooperative situations. It is a very 
strong mechanism that leads to cooperative behavior in humans (chapter II), by 
aligning the group interest with the individuals’ interest. In order to achieve a good 
reputation one can help others in the own social group. However, it is also possible 
to increase ones reputation through giving help to charity, even though the help is 
thereby given to others outside the own social group (chapter I). An individuals’ good 
reputation can be viewed as a currency that can be accumulated by helping others. 
Humans do not differentiate where the reputation was built; rather this currency is 
highly valuable within and outside the own social group (chapter V).  
Nevertheless achieving a good reputation is costly. If reputation is missing, as 
the incentive, humans reduce their investment into public resources. Humans are 
very aware of the situational circumstances and very strategically invest into their 
reputation (chapter IV). However, even in complete absence of reputation or other 
mechanisms that promote cooperation, like punishment, it is possible to establish 
circumstances under which cooperation can be sustained, on average on a 
substantial level (chapter III).  
There are still many open questions about human cooperative behavior. Not 
all acts of help have the same value, so what kind of value system do we apply? 
How exactly do we keep track of the reputation of social partners? Do we keep an 
accumulated score or do we assess a score in the beginning of a relationship and 
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later on only adjust the score when the partners’ behavior changes? Future studies 
should also discriminate between individuals. Humans often behave quite different in 
exactly the same circumstances, probably depending on previous experience, 
knowledge and at least to some extend genetics. In our experiments we could 
observe a wide range of individual behavior, ranging from highly cooperative 
individuals to unconditional defectors. Therefore also the mixture of groups can be 
viewed as a factor that influences whether cooperation can be achieved or not. It will 
be crucial to know in the future these and other unknown circumstances, in order to 
predict how circumstances have to be altered, to make people behave more 
cooperatively. 
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Glossary 
 
Direct fitness (Direkte Fitneß) 
An individuals’ genetic contribution to the next generation through the own 
reproduction. 
Evolutionary stable strategy (Evolutionsstabile Strategie, ESS) 
Strategies that cannot be replaced by alternative strategies, when a certain 
proportion of individuals within a population uses these strategies.  
Fitness (Fitneß) 
An individuals’ overall genetic contribution to the next generation. Often 
measured in the number of surviving grandchildren. 
Group selection (Gruppenselektion) 
The process when groups differ in their collective characteristics and this 
difference correlates with the survival chances of the group. 
Kin selection (Verwandtenselektion) 
The process when individuals differ in a way that influences parental care or 
their helping behavior, thereby changing the survival chances of their offspring 
or other relatives. 
Mutualism (Mutualismus) 
A relationship or an action that is profitable for both parties involved. 
Reciprocal altruism / Reciprocity (Reziproker Altruismus / Reziprozität) 
Help is given by a donor, which the recipient of the help returns at a later point 
in time. 
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Appendix 
 
Original text introduction by the computer program (experiment chapter 
IV) 
 
Page 1 
     Willkommen zu diesem Experiment, in dem Sie Geld verdienen können.  
 
     Zu Beginn des Experiments bekommen Sie 10,- Euro auf Ihr Konto 
gutgeschrieben. 
     Während des Experiments können sie Geld dazugewinnen oder verlieren.  
     Das hängt von Ihren eigenen Entscheidungen und den Entscheidungen der 
anderen  
     TeilnehmerInnen ab. Ihre Entscheidungen sind anonym. 
     Am Ende wird Ihnen Ihr Kontostand bar ausgezahlt.  
     Vor Ihnen befindet sich ein Schaltkasten mit zwei Tasten und einer roten 
     Leuchte. Es ist nur möglich über die Tasten eine Eingabe zu machen, wenn die  
     Leuchte an Ihrem Platz aufleuchtet. Es gibt eine JA- und eine NEIN-Taste.  
     Sie werden im Verlauf dieses Experiments nur JA oder NEIN Entscheidungen 
treffen. 
 
     DAMIT DIESES EXPERIMENT GELINGT, DÜRFEN SIE AUF KEINEN FALL MIT  
     ANDEREN REDEN ODER SICH AUF EINE ANDERE WEISE BEMERKBAR 
     MACHEN! 
 
     Wenn Sie diesen Text vollständig gelesen haben, bestätigen Sie dies bitte mit 
     einem Druck auf die JA-Taste, sobald die rote Leuchte an Ihrem Schaltplatz 
     aufleuchtet. 
     Wenn alle TeilnehmerInnen mit JA bestätigt haben, erscheint die nächste Seite. 
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Page 2 
     Im Verlauf dieses Experiments werden sie Entscheidungen in zwei 
unterschiedlichen  
     Situationen treffen. 
     IN DER ERSTEN SITUATION (=Paarrunde) treffen zwei Teilnehmer in einer 
Runde  
     aufeinander. 
 
     Hier gibt es zwei verschiedene Rollen, die Ihnen der Computer während  
     des Experiments wiederholt, aber gleichhäufig zulost. 
     Einmal sind Sie in der Rolle der potentiellen GeberIn, das andere Mal sind Sie in 
der  
     Rolle der potentiellen EmpfängerIn. 
     Nur die GeberIn hat eine aktive Rolle, in der sie der EmpfängerIn gibt oder nicht 
gibt. 
     Es ist ausgeschlossen, daß eine GeberIn und eine EmpfängerIn in umgekehrten  
     (reziproken) Rollen im Verlauf des Experiments aufeinandertreffen können. 
 
     Z.B. Wenn A als potentielle GeberIn auf B als potentielle EmpfängerIn getroffen 
ist,  
     wird B nie als potentielle GeberIn auf A als potentielle EmpfängerIn treffen. 
 
     Es werden Ihnen für den Verlauf des Experiments pro Person zwei Pseudonamen  
     zugeteilt. 
     Sie spielen also unter zwei verschiedenen Namen. 
     Die Pseudonamen sind Namen von Monden unseres Sonnensystems (Leda, 
Triton,  
     Portia, Sinope, Metis, Ananke, Kallisto, Telesto, Japetus, Despina, Galatea, 
Okeanos, 
     Elara, Vestia, Rhea und Nereid) 
 
 
     Wenn Sie diesen Text vollständig gelesen haben bestätigen Sie dies bitte mit 
     einem Druck auf die JA-Taste sobald die rote Leuchte an Ihrem Schaltplatz 
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     aufleuchtet. 
     Wenn alle Teilnehmer mit JA bestätigt haben erscheint die nächste Seite. 
 
Page 3 
     FORTSETZUNG: ERSTE SITUATION (Paarrunde) 
     Als GeberIn wird Ihnen eine Frage gestellt. "Wollen Sie dieser TeilnehmerIn 
geben?"  
     Sie können hierauf mit JA oder NEIN antworten.  
     Entscheiden Sie sich für JA, so werden Ihrem Konto 1,25 Euro abgezogen und  
     der EmpfängerIn werden 2,00 Euro gutgeschrieben. (0,75 Euro werden von uns  
     dazugegeben.) 
     Entscheiden Sie sich für NEIN, so wird Ihnen nichts abgezogen und der 
EmpfängerIn  
     nichts gutgeschrieben. 
 
     Entscheidung GeberIn (Gewinn-Verlust)  EmpfängerIn (Gewinn-Verlust) 
    
     JA   -1,25 Euro    +2,00 Euro  
     NEIN  0,00 Euro    0,00 Euro 
 
     Wenn Sie diesen Text vollständig gelesen haben, bestätigen Sie dies bitte mit 
     einem Druck auf die JA-Taste, sobald die rote Leuchte an Ihrem Schaltplatz 
     aufleuchtet. 
     Wenn alle TeilnehmerInnen mit JA bestätigt haben, erscheint die nächste Seite. 
 
Page 4 
     FORTSETZUNG: ERSTE SITUATION (Paarrunde) 
     Bevor Sie Ihre Entscheidung treffen, erscheinen einige Informationen.  
     Hier können Sie ablesen, wie die jeweilige EmpfängerIn in den 
vorausgegangenen  
     Runden entschieden hat, als sie sich in der Rolle der GeberIn befand. 
 
     Beispiel: 
     EMPFÄNGERIN "Triton" 
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     Runde Hat "Triton" gegeben? 
 
     1  JA 
 
     2  NEIN 
 
     3  NEIN 
 
     Falls die TeilnehmerIn noch nicht in der Rolle der GeberIn war erscheint 
folgendes: 
     EMPFÄNGERIN "Triton" 
 
     Runde Hat "Triton" gegeben? 
 
     1 
 
 
     Wenn Sie diesen Text vollständig gelesen haben bestätigen Sie dies bitte mit 
     einem Druck auf die JA-Taste sobald die rote Leuchte an Ihrem Schaltplatz 
     aufleuchtet. 
     Wenn alle TeilnehmerInnen mit JA bestätigt haben erscheint die nächste Seite. 
 
Page 5 
     IN DER ZWEITEN SITUATION (Gemeinschaftsrunde) treffen alle Teilnehmer der  
     Gruppe gleichzeitig eine Entscheidung. 
 
     Sie werden alle gefragt, ob Sie 1,25 Euro in den Gemeinschaftstopf  
     investieren wollen. Alle Spieler entscheiden nun nacheinander. Die 
Entscheidungen  
     werden jedoch NICHT an die Wand projeziert. Erst wenn alle Spieler entschieden   
     haben, werden die Entscheidungen angezeigt. Danach wird der Betrag im   
     Gemeinschaftstopf verdoppelt und zu gleichen Teilen an alle Spieler ausgezahlt, 
     unabhängig davon ob Sie in den Gemeinschaftstopf eingezahlt haben oder nicht. 
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     BEISPIEL (5 Spieler): 
     Nereid  Triton  Galatea Sinope Phobos 
 
     Entscheidung 
     JA   NEIN  NEIN  JA  JA 
 
     Abzug vom Konto des Spielers 
     -1,25 Euro -0,00 Euro -0,00 Euro -1,25 Euro -1,25 Euro 
 
     Auszahlung an alle Spieler (Verdoppelter Gemeinschaftstopf durch Anzahl der 
Spieler) 
     +1,50 Euro +1,50 Euro +1,50 Euro +1,50 Euro +1,50 Euro 
 
     Wenn Sie diesen Text vollständig gelesen haben bestätigen Sie dies bitte mit 
     einem Druck auf die JA-Taste sobald die rote Leuchte an Ihrem Schaltplatz 
     aufleuchtet. 
     Wenn alle TeilnehmerInnen mit JA bestätigt haben erscheint die nächste Seite. 
Page 6 
     Es werden Ihnen jetzt ZWEI Pseudonamen zugeteilt.  
 
     Ihr erster Pseudoname WIRD IMMER in den Paarrunden angezeigt.  
     In den Gemeinschaftsrunden wird ENTWEDER Ihr erster ODER Ihr zweiter  
     Pseudoname angezeigt. 
     Die Informationen in der Paarrunde zeigen nur wie der aktuelle Empfänger  
     unter seinem ersten Pseudonamen bis dahin gespielt hat. 
 
     Die Pseudonamen werden gleich nacheinander auf dem Bildschirm erscheinen.  
     Wenn die Lampe an Ihrem Platz leuchtet, ist der angezeigte Name Ihr erster 
     Pseudoname für dieses Experiment.  
     Bestätigen Sie diesen Namen bitte indem Sie nacheinander  
     einmal JA und einmal NEIN drücken. 
 
     Wenn die Lampe an Ihrem Platz erneut leuchtet, ist der angezeigte Name Ihr 
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     zweiter Pseudoname für dieses Experiment. 
     Bestätigen Sie diesen Namen bitte genauso wie den ersten, indem Sie  
     nacheinander einmal JA und einmal NEIN drücken. 
 
     Wenn Sie diesen Text vollständig gelesen haben bestätigen Sie dies bitte mit 
     einem Druck auf die JA-Taste sobald die rote Leuchte an Ihrem Schaltplatz 
     aufleuchtet. 
     Wenn alle TeilnehmerInnen mit JA bestätigt haben erscheint die nächste Seite. 
Page 7 
     JETZT BEGINNT DAS EXPERIMENT! 
 
     Sie werden entweder gefragt, ob Sie in den Gemeinschaftstopf einzahlen wollen 
     (die Pseudonamen aller Spieler werden angezeigt), oder Sie werden gefragt ob 
Sie  
     einer angezeigten EmpfängerIn 1,25 Euro von Ihrem Konto geben wollen oder 
nicht  
     (nur der Pseudoname eines Spielers wird angezeigt).  
 
     Sie haben ein Startguthaben von 10,- Euro auf Ihrem Konto. 
 
     Wenn Sie diesen Text vollständig gelesen haben bestätigen Sie dies bitte mit 
     einem Druck auf die JA-Taste sobald die rote Leuchte an Ihrem Schaltplatz 
     aufleuchtet. 
     Wenn alle TeilnehmerInnen mit JA bestätigt haben erscheint die nächste Seite. 
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